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ABSTRACT
HISTORICAL IMPLICATIONS OF THE BLACK CIVIL RIGHTS MOVEMENT
PRIOR TO THE BROWN DECISION ON LEGISLATION FOR THE DISABLED
Robert Michael Thomas, B.A., M.S.
Marquette University, 2011

Black children achieved equal protection rights to
attend K-12 public schools following the Brown v. Board of
Education Supreme Court holding in 1954. Scholars claimed
Brown was a catalyst for admittance of disabled students as
well. They believed tactics of the Black Civil Rights
Movement influenced advocates of disabled students during
the Civil Rights Era (1954-68). Scholars assumed race and
minority status were key to obtaining due process
legislation for the disabled in the 1970’s.
An historical analysis of primary sources including
court cases, Congressional testimony, biographical and
personal statements of disabled individuals, and secondary
sources of authors and journal writers revealed the
Disability Rights Movement was influenced more by Supreme
Court cases during 1948-50 than by the Brown decision.
These cases emphasized individuality and the value of
personal equal protection rights over race, group
consciousness, and minority status.
The study reveals how revisiting the relationship
between the pre-Brown activity around equal protection and
the passage of due process rights legislation for the
disabled changes the way scholars must now view special
education.
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CHAPTER ONE
INTRODUCTION

Historical Interpretation of Educating the Disabled
Most educational scholars who author textbooks have
acknowledged an historical connection between the Black
Civil Rights Movement (BCRM) and later enactment of
legislation for educating K-12 disabled students in public
schools in the United States (Hardman, Drew, and Egan,
2008; Kirk, Gallagher, and Anastasiow, 2000; Gearheart,
Weishahn, and Gearheart, 1996). In their writings, designed
for an audience of educators being trained to teach
disabled students at the K-12 level, they imply that a
seamless transition occurred to educate minority students
and disabled students in regular public schools following
the Brown v Board of Education (1954) Supreme Court
decision mandating integration of blacks into K-12 public
schools. According to Turnbull III, (1986, p. 8) the door
to public schooling of the disabled was opened because
“Brown gave rise to the right-to-education cases…judicial
resolution of educational issues on constitutional grounds
becomes precedent for judicial resolution of related civil
rights issues on similar constitutional grounds”.
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Focus of the Problem
One might assume from Turnbull III’s (1986) reasoning
that education of disabled students logically followed
Court ordered education of blacks and other minorities.
This reasoning would imply that disabled students
constituted a minority group similar to black students. Yet
Congress did not recognize disabled students as a distinct
minority group until 1973, nineteen years after the Brown
decision. Therefore, one cannot assume a linkage of
expectations of due process and equal protection based upon
minority status during the black Civil Rights Era (195468).
Data confirmed that over three million disabled
students were excluded from regular public schools during
this time period (U.S. Senate, Committee on Labor and
Public Welfare, Subcommittee on the Handicapped, 1973).
Where scholars have failed was to examine equal protection
litigation prior to Brown and determine how those holdings
influenced what later would be known as the Disability
Rights Movement (DRM). This examination of litigation prior
to Brown would better explain how advocates of the disabled
acquired Congressional legislation mandating inclusion of
disabled students in K-12 public schools.
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The purpose of this paper is to examine this question:
What was the relationship between litigation by the Black
Civil Rights Movement (BCRM) prior to Brown to achieve
equal protection for minorities to subsequent actions of
DRM proponents to secure due process legislation for the
disabled?
This examination will unravel how scholars view the
structural framework of special education and service
delivery today that adds to our scholarly knowledge beyond
simplistic interpretations of textbook authors. Structural
framework involves the premise upon which special education
is defined. Scholars have failed to make the connection
that litigation prior to Brown influenced legislation that
established the theoretical interpretation and the
structural framework of how special education was created.
Previous scholars like Hardman (2008), Gearheart et
al., (1996); Kaplan, 1996; and Turnbull III (1986) have
failed to explore the Black Civil Rights Movement (BCRM)
and Disability Rights Movement (DRM) relationship prior to
the Brown decision and its affects on special education
legislation. Scholars instead have provided a narrative
commentary on how major civil rights events in the South
from 1954-68 affected those fighting for due process for
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the disabled, or as Switzer (2003, p. 83) claimed,
“disability community activists have been able to
“piggyback” on several decades of protest from the civil
rights movement”. They have asked the reader to assume the
fight for equal protection for blacks was aligned with due
process for the disabled. However, examining actions prior
to Brown demonstrated the lack of a seamless transition
between the two movements and the uselessness of this
commentary. Scholars have asked the wrong question and
chosen a non-critical time period (1954-68).
It was natural for scholars to connect the Brown
decision toward educating the disabled, because this case
“laid the foundation for future right to education cases on
behalf of students with disabilities” (Osbourne, Jr., 1996,
p. 4). According to Osbourne Jr., (1996, p.5) “Students
with disabilities became known as the other minority as
special educators and parents demanded that they be
accorded the same rights to an educational opportunity that
had been gained by racial and ethnic minorities”. Turnbull
III (1986, p. 8) reinforced the connection of Brown toward
education of disabled students by stating, “It was the seed
that gave birth to other civil rights battles and to
grounds for successful challenges to governmental
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discrimination against certain persons because of their
unalterable personal characteristics”. Turnbull III (1986,
p. 8) emphasized Brown’s importance to the DRM because it
legitimized the legal arguments of civil rights activists
“furnishing them with a powerful tool for persuading
legislatures, particularly Congress, to enact
antidiscrimination legislation”. He maintained there were
“undeniable similarities between the Brown plaintiffs and
children with disabilities” (p. 9). Therefore scholars
could justify the leap of the right to education from
minority students to disabled students.
My position states that this leap from connecting
rights of the minority to rights of the disabled ignored
the more subtle reasoning that education for the disabled
developed around equal protection and due process rights of
the individual in litigation for the disabled in the 1960’s
and 1970’s. The value of individuality and the denial of
equal protection on a personal level were lost when
scholars painted a broad brush by assuming legal arguments
in Brown that protected the minority in a class action
equated similarly to the disabled.
This broad assessment might be the result of how our
legal system is structured. In order to have courts address
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plaintiffs’ charges of denial of equal protection rights,
the Legal Defense Team representing blacks filed class
action suits that would encompass the entire minority
group. Class action suits provided access to the federal
court system. Scholars emphasized this class action linkage
when DRM advocates imitated the legal tactics of the BCRM
in the late 1960’s and early 1970’s. My claim is that these
scholars, while concentrating upon group dynamics and
minority status in this litigation, missed the personal and
individualistic nature that was the real basis for decision
making in litigation for the disabled.
Scholars neglected to cite four prior cases (1938-50)
that were cited by the Justices in the Brown case, that
will be explained in chapter two, that recognized that
denial of equal protection was a personal matter that
affected the individual in his or her daily societal
living, and was a living reality distinct from courtroom
artificial legal arguments of class action. It was the
reality of denial of due process and equal protection in
society that were the basis of litigation by advocates of
the disabled. Alexander and Alexander (2001, p. 440)
maintained “the legal mandate of Brown v. Board of
Education set a precedent for the extension of educational
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access to all children, including those with disabilities”.
However, it is my conviction that scholars recognize the
connection to Brown in DRM litigation is to prior cases of
individual loss of equal protection on which much of Brown
was argued. Class action that represented an entire
minority group was needed to gain access to the legal
system, but collective group consciousness and recognition
of minority status were not the legal constructs that made
a difference for the disabled.
Rather than examining the similarities and differences
of the BCRM and the DRM during the U. S. Civil Rights
period, (1954-68) scholars need to examine the more germane
question I propose: whether the tactics employed to acquire
equal protection for blacks prior to Brown correlate,
parallel, or refute actions taken subsequently by DRM
leaders to acquire due process legislation. This question
is more important because it substantiates that while much
key literature attempted to address whether disabled people
were recognized as a distinct minority group worthy of
societal accommodations, that argument is inconsequential.
What is of paramount interest is that the relationship
of the BCRM and the DRM prior to Brown focused on due
process as personal to the petitioner along the lines of
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individuality, not according solely to race, group, class
minority status, or class-consciousness. The legal focus on
individuality fueled litigation and legislation towards due
process and helped change society’s impression of disabled
people from one of paternalism to independence. More
important, this new knowledge can help scholars view
special education within the structural framework as it
exists in schools today.
Relationship Between Two Movements
Scholars like (Switzer, 2003; Scotch, 2001; Fleisher &
Zames, 2001; Francis & Silvers, 2000; Percy, 1989) have
established over the years that the BCRM had a profound
impact on individuals fighting for due process rights for
disabled people in the similar manner and tactics they
chose. Some examples included the disabled college students
at Berkeley, led by Ed Roberts, who challenged their
restrictive housing situation in 1962. Mobility challenged
workers, directed by Judy Heumann, protested the lack of
transportation options with a sit-in in Richard Nixon’s
election campaign office in New York City in 1972. In
Denver, Colorado disabled workers created a media blitz
about buses without adequate wheel chair lifts.
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While this impact may be similar and has been handed
forward by textbook authors to those who would teach K-12
special education, what needs to be fleshed out on a
scholarly level is the relationship of litigation which led
to Brown to activities which impelled Congress to enact
legislation of due process for disabled K-12 students in
1973 and 1975. Scholars may be surprised to learn, for
example, that advocacy for legislation for blacks was based
on civil rights while advocacy for due process for the
disabled initially followed economic concerns.
What scholars have to gain is recognition that
legislation establishing their due process rights for the
disabled would be based upon accepting their individuality
and distinct disability, not their class-consciousness of a
larger minority group like blacks. Individuality implied
that society accepted a disability as endemic to the person
and accommodate and change its perspective of the disabled
from one of dependence to independence, recognizing the
disabled person’s right to control their own life. This may
enable scholars to understand how expectations of disabled
people evolved from dependence to independence and why
treatment models evolved from medical/ institutional in the
1940’s to educational/inclusive by the 1970’s. This
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evolution in treatment models helps to explain the
increasing advocacy that special needs children be educated
in an inclusive setting.
While some special education scholars (Scotch, 2001;
Fleisher & Zames, 2001; Percy, 1989; Abeson, Bolick, and
Hass, 1975) have noted and/or questioned the twenty-year
time lag between education of minorities and the disabled,
this is an unnecessary question. It adds nothing to the
scholarly pursuit of how the development of special
education legislation, impacted by litigation prior to
Brown, predicated how special education is administered
today in K-12 public schools.
A more important question is how litigation by the
BCRM prior to Brown laid the groundwork for judicial
acceptance of the individuality of the individual, and thus
rendered the petitioner worthy of equal protection rather
than valued because of race. This acceptance placed equal
protection on a personal rather than a class-conscious
basis. This would be a cornerstone of legal argument for
advocates of the disabled in litigation from 1967-73.
An historical evolution of social acceptance of the
disabled in chapter two will focus on primary sources of
Supreme Court and state court cases and the participants,
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testimony at House and Senate Congressional committees
exploring due process legislation for the disabled, and
testimony from legislative aides who helped design what
became current legislation. Testimonials from disabled
individual leaders will document their drive to acquire
independence and greater control of their lives. Secondary
sources of authors, journal scholars, advocates of the
disabled, and written histories of disabled authors
themselves will be used to examine evolving societal
perspectives and expectations of disabilities.
Critical for identifying relationships between the two
movements are the needs to examine the similarities and
differences in organization, leadership, membership, and
tactics by examining previously cited court holdings,
Congressional testimony, analysis by participants who
participated in creating legislation, and analysis from
secondary source authors. Thus this paper will highlight
how legislation for the disabled developed when these four
characteristics were juxtaposed with the litigation
displayed by the Black Civil Rights Movement (BCRM) prior
to the Brown decision.
Chapter three will analyze, critique, and reinterpret
the relationship of the two movements by utilizing the
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methodology of historical research. Berg (2007, p. 234)
defined historical research as “a process that examines
events or combinations of events in order to uncover
accounts of what happened in the past”. As Anderson (1990,
p. 113) suggested, “Unlike other forms of educational
research, the historical researcher does not create data.
Rather, the historian attempts to discover data that exists
already in some form”. Of course, scholars may differ with
my historical interpretation. As Borg and Gall (1989, p.
806) reminded, “Historians add another layer of
interpretation in the way they choose to emphasize or
ignore facts about the past and in the way they fit facts
into categories and patterns”.
My analysis will suggest an alternative relationship
between the BCRM and the DRM from what previous scholars
have represented based on data prior to the Brown decision.
It will explore equal protection court cases of blacks that
culminated with the Brown decision. It will make the
connection between these cases and subsequent litigation
from advocates of the disabled. This connection will allow
scholars to reinterpret the relationship between the BCRM
and the DRM that helps them better understand current K-12
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framework.
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CHAPTER TWO
HISTORICAL EVOLUTION OF SOCIAL ACCEPTANCE OF THE DISABLED

Introduction
The goal of this chapter is to present an historical
timeline of education for the disabled in the United States
and to highlight society’s changing acceptance and
expectations of disabled people from 1800-1970. This will
be juxtaposed with education for blacks from 1865-1954 to
show that while scholars have never questioned minority
status for blacks, scholars have debated and questioned
with differing viewpoints whether minority status applied
to disabled people. This was a contentious issue from 194873 that constituted a copious amount of scholarly
literature. It was, however, a pointless argument
disconnected from the central issue. This issue was the
relationship between the BCRM and the DRM prior to the
Brown v. Board of Education decision. I make the contention
that scholars and textbook authors examining the
relationship between the BCRM and the DRM during the Civil
Rights Era have examined the wrong data in the wrong time
frame.
It is immaterial whether a group may be recognized
with minority status and thus entitled to societal
accommodations to achieve inclusion. Minority status was
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never the basis upon which legislation for due process for
the disabled was premised. The real premise was
individuality of the person and the distinct disability
that determined due process rights. The important time
period was 1948-50 when the BCRM litigated several Supreme
Court cases seeking equal protection, not the Brown case
and succeeding Civil Rights Era (1954-68). Brown was the
culminating event, not the climactic event that led to due
process in the 1970’s for the disabled. What was of
importance with prior Brown cases was their legal emphasis
on individual rights of the petitioner and that denial of
equal protection harmed the petitioner in a personal sense.
The importance of the relationship I pose is that
litigation prior to Brown seeking equal protection for
blacks affected the DRM’s success at achieving due process
legislation, because prior litigation emphasized the
individuality and personal disability of the petitioner
over race, group, class-consciousness, or minority status.
Evidence of the lack of importance in establishing minority
status may be attributed to Congress’ tardiness of
recognition of minority status to the disabled until 1973,
long after the Civil Rights era ended. When examining how
disabled people acquired federal due process legislation,
the political and lobbying support that it entailed, and
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individual efforts by the disabled themselves, scholars
instead should focus their attention on the role of
individuality and how that influenced a societal change of
expectation from paternalism to independence, instead of
alluding to race and minority status.
This chapter will highlight litigation from the BCRM
prior to Brown and subsequent DRM litigation in the 1960’s
and 1970’s to demonstrate the linkage of individuality
between the two movements and why this was important in
achieving due process legislation for the disabled in 1973
and 1975. Creation of special education following passage
of this legislation was based on individuality, personal
disability, and personal needs toward independence.
Compulsory Education Versus Exclusion
In order to understand why due process legislation was
proposed in Congress, one must undertake an historical
review of education of the disabled. Initial review
revealed that educators and lawmakers who promoted
compulsory education meant it for “normal” students and not
those with physical or mental defects. According to
Osbourne Jr., (1996) education of disabled K-12 students in
the United States from 1800 to 1975 was one of either
exclusion or segregation. Rothstein (2000, p. 12) noted
that, “While the Supreme Court has held consistently that
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there is no federally protected right to education,
nonetheless, if the state undertakes to provide education…a
property interest is thereby created by the state”. In a
pivotal Supreme Court case that defined the pursuit of
happiness being linked to the ability to own property, the
Court ruled that one’s ability to own property was
inherently linked to one’s level of education (Wood v.
Stricklnd (1975)). The Constitution under the Fourteenth
Amendment protects deprivation of life, liberty, or
property without due process of law or equal protection of
the law. Legal scholar Ashley Thomas King (Byrnes, 2002, p.
118) maintained that between 1852 and 1918 state
legislatures “promulgated a right to an education through
passage of compulsory education legislation applicable,
theoretically, to all school-age children within their
jurisdiction”.
However, Osbourne Jr. (1996, p. 4) maintained that
minorities and the disabled were usually excluded because
in the “dilemma between exclusionary practices and
compulsory education statutes” state appeals courts granted
“the authority of school officials to exclude certain
students”. Reasoning to exclude disabled children during
the late 1800’s was to relieve stress on the teacher and
other students (Beattie v. Board of Education of the City
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of Antigo, 1919; Rothman, 2000, p. 11). More progressive
reasoning in later years was to “avoid stress on the child”
and to provide first “diluted academic training” followed
up with “training for manual jobs” (Rothman, 2000, p. 11).
To understand the relationship between the BCRM and
advocates of the DRM prior to the historic Brown decision,
one must compare the educational history of America’s black
and disabled students. Several scholars have claimed
(Rothman, 2003; Scotch, 2001; Bryan, 1998; Gilson and
Deploy, 2000; Osborne) that individuals with disabilities
and their advocates could not help but be influenced by
actions, events, and events generated by the BCRM since
both groups had been routinely denied inclusion at regular
public schools. These influences such as marches, boycotts,
sit-ins and demonstrations have been well documented by
previous scholars following the Brown decision, but the
relationship has not been investigated in the run-up of
events prior to the Brown decision.
These scholars have erred in choosing to focus how the
judicial holding in Brown centered on race when the true
focus centered on individuality and personal equal
protection exhibited in holdings of prior cases. This error
in emphasis has led scholars like Hardeman et al., (2008)
Osbourne Jr., (1996) and Turnbull III (1986) to assume race
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and minority status were a linkage to the DRM in a seamless
transition. When in fact a time gap occurred.
While Brown may have been a catalyst for advocates
seeking due process rights for the disabled, it did not
generate dramatic improvement in K-12 enrollment of
disabled students in regular public schools. Rothstein
(2000, p. 16) documented that as late as 1975 one million
disabled students were excluded from the public school
system and over three million were attending schools in
inappropriate settings for them to learn. As Cremins (1983,
p. 15) noted, “ The period between 1954 and 1970 was for
the most part a latent one in the area of landmark cases
that would impact on the education of the handicapped”.
Scotch (2001) added that during this time period it was the
courts that supported due process rights and not
legislation. This was borne out in cases that will be
discussed: Wyatt, Wolf, Diana, PARC, and Mills.
History of Special Education in the United States 1800-1970
Education of the disabled in the United States
developed slowly over time and was one of recognizing that
educating meant teaching toward independence, not
categorizing a disabled person into a group. The history of
educational rights for disabled people has been
characterized by Gearheart, el al. (1996) as one of four
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phases: 1) Early history: Before 1800, 2) Era of
institutions: 1800-1900, 3) Era of public school special
classes: 1900-1960/70, and 4) Era of growth and
reevaluation: 1960 to the present. Moreover, scholars have
identified three distinct expectations of disabled people
within these four phases of education: 1) vocational
training, 2) paternalism, and 3) independence (Bryan, 2002;
1996; Scotch, 2001; Covey, 1998; Charlton, 1998).
Previous to modern times, local governmental
authorities did not feel compelled to grant any civil or
educational rights to disabled people prior to 1800 because
contemporary thinking considered a disability to be the
work of demons or evil spirits (Covey, 1998). Actions taken
against a disabled child such as abandoning him or her or
leaving the child by the side of a road were not considered
barbaric, because the disabled were considered inhuman
(Bryan, 2002). This attitude began to change gradually
within Christian nations and Christianity’s theology of
compassion. By Colonial days, disabled persons were thought
more to be fools, idiots, or buffoons rather than the work
of the devil. They were to be protected and kept safe from
social abuse.
By 1800 European nations attempted to provide a small
degree of education for the disabled in institutions in
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England, France, Germany, and Scotland. Researchers of the
blind, deaf, and mentally defective learned that disabled
individuals learned similar to normal people, but at a
differing rate (Bryan, 1998; Covey, 1996). Thus they could
profit from educational schooling. However, these
institutions were provided mainly for individuals with
visual or auditory impairments rather than for people with
mental retardation or emotional disabilities.
The first institution for the mentally retarded was
begun in France in 1831. There research about mental age
first developed and culminated in 1904 with the development
of the intelligence quotient (IQ) by Simon Binet. Binet
attempted to establish a linkage between mental age and
chronological age. In France by the mid 1800’s, several
institutions in or near Paris were operating with
educational programs for the disabled.
In the United States there was little federal
involvement to educate the disabled in the 1800’s.
According to Turnbull III, (1986, p. 13)
“The earliest federal role – creating special schools
for the mentally ill, blind, and deaf between the
1820’s and the 1870’s – paralleled a similar movement
at the state level, in which state schools for the
handicapped were established as early as 1823”.
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However, Kirk et al. (1996, p. 43) stated, “Before 1850
there were few public provisions for children or adults
with special needs. They were “stored away” in poorhouses
and other charitable centers or left at home with no
educational opportunities”. According to Kirk et al., 1996)
it was not until 1896 that the first special class for
mentally retarded schools was established in Providence,
Rhode Island, followed by a class for children with
physical impairments in 1899, and a class for the blind in
Chicago in 1900. Further federal activity did not occur
until the government created vocational rehabilitation
programs for disabled veterans following World Wars I and
II (Zames & Fleischer, 2001; Scotch, 1989; Turnbull III
1986; Broudy, 1983).
Three Societal Historical Expectations of the Disabled
In regard to society’s expectation of the disabled in
the United States, the first expectation elaborated by
Percy (1989, p. 44-47) was one of economics and vocational
training where federal and state governments created
training programs to teach manual labor skills that would
increase economic conditions for the disabled. Disabled
people acquired job skills that were rudimentary and often
government funded such as the Smith-Fess Act of 1920 that
provided vocational training, job placement, and
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counseling, and is administered to the present by the
Federal Board for Vocational Rehabilitation. Self-help
disability agencies like Goodwill and Disabled American
Veterans also encouraged job skills and vocational
training.
Following World War II when the nation was faced with
thousands of returning soldiers with physical and mental
incapacities, the federal government accepted
responsibility for restoring these returning veterans to
mainstream life. This responsibility was economic in nature
rather than an acceptance of civil rights for the disabled.
In fact, Zames and Fleischer (2001, p. 7) reported:
“Although disabled veterans were given priority in
employment, civilians with similar disabilities were
considered unemployable … so they should seek jobs in
private industry.” Vocational programs were created to
bestow benefits, monetary payments, and sheltered work
training programs to disabled individuals that would
increase their integration into mainstream society rather
than recognize their disability as an accepted right
(Scotch, 2001; Bryan, 1996; Percy, 1989). . These
organizations formed connections with mainstream business
outlets to sell their goods to the general public (Bryan,
1996).
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During the 1950’s a second expectation of disabilities

developed that Covey (1998) and Bryan (1996) defined as a
paternalistic view where either governmental or lobbyist
national organizations who advocated for the disabled
provided funding through either charitable contributions or
governmental transfer payments. Examples provided by Scotch
(2001) included Paralyzed Veterans of America (PVA), the
National Association of the DEAF (NAD), the American
Council of the Blind (ACB), the National Association of
Retarded Citizens (NARC), the United Cerebral Palsy
Associations and the federal government’s Social Security
Disability Insurance program (SSI). While these
organizations had political involvement, it has been argued
by Scotch (2001 p. 34) “none was oriented toward the
general issue of civil rights for all disabled people”.
Disabled people themselves were not members of these
organizations.
After the war, several special interest organizations
and agencies like the Heart Association, the Cancer
Society, Easter Seals with its March of Dimes, United
Cerebral Palsy, and the Muscular Dystrophy Association
provided funding and positive publicity toward educating
the disabled (Rothman, 2003). However, organizations like
Muscular Dystrophy and United Cerebral Palsy Association
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concentrated funding and assistance more on the cause of
the disability, rather than on its effects on those
currently disabled. Much of their funding centered on
searching for a cure or prevention of the disability rather
than providing for accommodations (Zames & Fleischer,
2001).
Institutionalization rather than accommodation within
mainstream society remained the method of treatment.
According to Rothman (2003, p. 27) “By the late 1950’s,
large, total care institutions provided most of the care
for disabled people. Some of these institutions specialized
in training people with specific kinds of disabilities for
employment”.
Given the institutional nature of care prevalent in
the 1950’s, treatment did not differentiate between
disability types. Hardeman et al. (2008) reported that
state run institutions housed disabled individuals into
separate gender care sections where they were taught to
perform menial tasks. This training did not address
specific mental, emotional, or learning disabilities, but
appeared to be designed more for the efficient running of
the institution rather than to increase the independence of
the individual. Family members were limited in the amount
of contact with their disabled family members. According to
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Smart (2001, p. 34-36) and Clarizio, (1983) institutions
administered a standardized medical model treatment
approach, which will be explained later in this chapter,
with over-reliance on physical doctors and pharmaceuticals
over educators and independent living trainers.
However, Hardeman et al. (2008) and Clarizio (1983)
reported that by the late 1950’s, a competing philosophical
model of treatment called “psychoeducational” placed more
emphasis on teaching to the specific disability, ignoring
the need to establish causation, and increasing a person’s
practical living skills as a more effective treatment
approach. A large number of disabled veterans, and parents
of children with intellectual impairments advocated that
disabled people desired public entitlements like access to
housing, transportation, and employment rather than
institutionalization in their living arrangements (Rothman,
2003; Bryan, 1996).
A third expectation of disabilities evolved by the
early 1960’s when disabled individuals, becoming more
politically active in their well-being, attempted to
resolve their personal local difficulties of housing,
transportation, and employment. Since many disabled people
no longer were seen as needing institutional care, more of
them began being released and living either with family or
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in independent living situations. This meant they needed
practical living skills to survive in normal society.
Recognizing their need for increased independence in order
to be included, they appealed to local governmental bodies
like city councils and housing authorities that to be
independent required societal accommodations that might
improve their chances for acquiring better practical living
skills and more inclusion.
During the 1950’s lobbying groups like the American
Association on Mental Retardation (AAMR) wielded more
political power than previously, and alternative treatment
approaches began to emerge. These lobbying groups clamored
for deinstitutionalization of the disabled and
reinstatement of due process rights, and more family
involvement (Hardman et. al., 2008; Turnbull III, 1986).
Several (Switzer, 2003; Scotch, 2001; Francis & Silvers,
2000; Charlton, 1998) have argued that this process was
slow to evolve because media attention was not focused on
disabled individuals in any national public awareness in
the 1950’s. Clarizio (1983) noted how treatment models
slowly changed from psychodynamic (medical/institutional)
from the 1920’to psychoeducational in the late 1950’s
(educational/societal). This meant that disabled
individuals obtained value within society as individuals
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rather than categorization as a member of a group. Emphasis
changed from requiring protection from society to learning
to cope within it. Advocates advanced that disabled people
had a productive role to play within the community and need
not be sheltered from it.
Education of Disabled Students in the 1960’s
With disabled people desiring more productive roles
within society, the shifting paradigm from medical to
educational was important for school age children because
this meant their learning needs could be met, for the most
part, in regular school settings with their peers, not in
segregated state hospitals. Consequently, according to
Hardeman et al. (2008) and Gearheart et al., (1996) a mass
release of disabled people from state institutions occurred
in the early 1960’s. For students this meant inclusion and
accommodation in state funded residential public school
settings for classes designed for deaf, blind, and the
significantly intellectually impaired. This meant they
would be receiving education with their own peers in a more
normal environment.
Gearheart et al. (1996) noted that with the adoption
of compulsory attendance laws for students beginning in the
early twentieth century, public schools faced the problem
of “providing for students with mild retardation. Thus
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public schools concentrated on “special” classes for
students with mild mental retardation” (p. 8). This
entailed that mildly disabled students, who concomitantly
had behavior problems, were placed in the classroom with
students having intellectual impairments, “and those who
could not get along in this obviously special setting were
expelled from school” (p. 8).
Thus the 1960’s to early 1970’s gave rise to the era
of the special class, a self-contained group of disabled
students segregated from regular peers for varying lengths
of the day. Gearheart et al. (1996, p. 9) described these
classes where “general educators happily sent problem
students to special classes, and special educators accepted
a number of students who should not have been
placed…Special classes were sometimes used as dumping
grounds, vehicles of segregation…”
According to Byrnes, (2002) Osbourne Jr., (1996) and
Turnbull III (1986) parents of disabled students became
dissatisfied with special classes and the inadequate life
skills their children were acquiring. They sought
litigation as their opportunity to gain inclusion into
regular public school classrooms and looked to tactics
previously enacted by the BCRM of marches, demonstrations,
and sit-ins as their model. Many scholars (Kluger, 2004;
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Gray, 2002; Payne, 1995; Carson, 1981) highlighted how this
movement of litigation for equal protection for minorities
begun in the 1940’s, reached notoriety to the general
public following the Brown decision in 1954. However, while
many scholars (Scotch, 2001; Zames & Fleischer, 2001;
Bryan, 1996; Percy, 1989; Scotch, 1989) have linked this
decision to subsequent actions in the 1960’s by the DRM
movement, I submit prior Supreme Court cases of 1948-50
have more significance because they stressed individuality
and the value of the person over race and minority rights.
This will be elaborated later in the chapter with four
equal protection cases from 1948-50 that emphasized
individual rights besides race.
Black Education 1865-1954
According to Williams (2004) and Anderson, (1988)
blacks in the United States prior to the Brown decision in
1954 were aware of their minority status and exclusion
because they had been supporting two separate school
systems with their taxes, one white and one black. Their
perception of exclusion changed with a stroke of the pen on
May 17, 1954 when many scholars of civil rights (Branch,
1998; Williams, 1986; Eyes on the Prize, 1986) claimed that
the American Civil Rights Movement in the twentieth century
began. On that day the United States Supreme Court struck

	
  

	
  

31	
  

down segregation of public school students because of race.
Refusing to address the issue whether black and white
schools under scrutiny were inherently equal, the court
maintained segregation based solely on race deprived blacks
of their education “even though the physical facilities and
other ‘tangible’ factors may be equal” (Brown v. Board of
Education, 1954, p. 4). Irons (2002, p. 162) argued, “What
the cases really involved was the psychological impact of
enforced separation on black children”. According to Irons
(2002) and Gray, (2002) The unanimous 9-0 decision
outlawing racial segregation in public schools and the
Court’s order for local school boards in Southern states to
integrate schools, challenged Jim Crow laws in the South,
enforced equal protection of the law under the Fourteenth
Amendment, and transformed the Southern way of life.
Several have argued that previous to Brown, blacks
especially in the South, had understood they were
responsible for creating educational opportunity for their
race; opportunity that had been denied since
Reconstruction, because Jim Crow laws in the South mandated
racial separation in schools (Irons, 2002; Haskins, 1998;
Anderson, 1988). Because blacks took the initiative to
create their own public school systems in the South, in
addition to the taxation they provided for state funded Jim
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Crow schools, their racial membership united them long
before the Brown decision in 1954. They understood their
local exclusion from the white community because according
to Anderson, (1988) many of their K-12 schools were built
with the economic funding of Northern philanthropists.
Having lived in a segregated racial society where they
were restricted to where they lived, played, worshipped,
conducted business, and congregated, they realized
themselves as a distinct minority that needed to be unified
to survive (Irons, 2002; Chafe, 2001; Vann Woodward, 1966).
Chafe (2001) reported how careful and circumspect a black
man must be when walking down a southern sidewalk. A Jim
Crow etiquette existed that required a black man to possess
two personalities; displaying an artificial deferential
behavior toward all white men, but asserting individual
dignity among people of his own race.
Because blacks were forced to pay the majority funding
for their common schools between 1915-1935 with the help of
Northern religious groups and Northern philanthropists like
Julius Rosenwald, William H. Baldwin, and the Carnegie
Foundation, (Anderson, 1988) they sought unity as a group
for protection against the white power structure. This
became more transparent in the 1950’s as according to
Charles Payne, (2003) in quoting Michael Honey’s term: a
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“transitional generation” developed after World War II of
black agitators and resisters who challenged Jim Crow “on
shop floors and in civic associations, in polling places
and city buses pointing the ways to the mode of
confrontation and direct action that would characterize the
decades to come” (p. 401).
These instigators were often returning veterans who
were rural oriented, poor, with little education, and who
had seen an alternative way of living while fighting
fascism. Payne (1995) indicated that they were unwilling to
tolerate lynching or to return to the Jim Crow South of
their past. They became the grassroots membership that
ignited the march toward justice when led by talented
leaders like the “Legal Defense Team” (Tushnet, 1987)
organized by the National Association for the Advancement
of Colored People (NAACP) and black ministers trained in
passive resistance at reputable divinity schools. Watson
2010, p. 48) reported how one Mississippi farmer once
described the power of the grassroots movement in Freedom
Summer, (Watson, 2010 p. 48) “It was the so-called dumb
people,… {who accomplished it} The school teachers, the
educated people, they ain’t did a damn thang!”. In other
words, educated blacks within local communities had failed
to galvanize a resistance to Jim Crow among less educated
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blacks. However, outsiders represented by the Legal Team of
the NAACP, were able to inspire these people toward action.
According to Branch, (1998) collective membership of
blacks had never been a contentious issue since they had
experienced exclusion during slavery and postReconstruction. During the Civil Rights Era, blacks sought
equal protection and inclusion in mainstream society but
were denied by a legalized Jim Crow power structure. Kluger
(2004) documented that despite sympathetic whites that
joined in the resistance tactics, blacks were a distinct
minority group recognized by themselves and others,
especially the federal courts when their civil rights were
violated.
Black Minority Status and Did It Matter?
Scholars like Barker, (1948) Fine and Asch, (1988)
Zola, (1989) Bryan, (1998) Nagler, 1993; Gilson and Depoy,
(2000) Mansbridge and Morris, (2001) Scotch, (2001) and
Switzer (2003) have debated since 1948 whether the disabled
population constituted a recognized minority group, whereas
they have accepted blacks’ minority status. Minority status
has been argued important because several scholars have
agreed that minorities deserve societal accommodations that
reverse discrimination in such areas as housing,
employment, job opportunities, education and training, and
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eligibility for social programs. Therefore, intellectual
thinking could make the claim that if a group could
establish its identity as a minority, society would be
required to provide opportunities for greater inclusion.
However, I propose determination of minority status is
irrelevant in examining the relationship between the BCRM
and the DRM. The forty years of back and forth debate has
been divisive and irrelevant. It was pointless because
legislation for due process rights for the disabled never
centered on minority status. Importance always lay in the
value of individual, personal rights which advocates of the
DRM were able to convince legislators had been based on
equal protection cases raised by the BCRM prior to Brown.
This point will be expounded upon later in this chapter. It
is only relevant to delineate the argument of minority
status in a review of key literature to understand that
minority status has always lurked in the background as a
bogeyman when the issue of due process and equal protection
were argued. A brief review of scholarly treatment of this
topic regarding blacks and the disabled is appropriate.
A review of key literature revealed that blacks were a
recognized minority group with a collective consciousness.
Historically, the (NAACP), founded in 1909, had been the
most noted organization in support of colored peoples’
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rights (Berg, 2005; Tushnet, 1987). As Berg, (2005) Branch,
(1998) and Williams (1986) showed, blacks needed
organizational support especially in the South where Jim
Crow Laws banned them from hotels, restaurants, gas
stations, recreational facilities, businesses, churches,
and other facilities where white people were able to
attend. Blacks in the South bonded together as a united
community and were forced to fight for their equal
protection against state and local officials regardless of
their economic or educational status. Middle class or poor,
highly educated or poorly educated, urban and rural, blacks
who suffered exclusion created a unified movement. Several
(Kluger, 2004; Payne, 1995; Eyes on the Prize, 1986) have
shown how this movement included both a group of political
and religious leaders, many trained in passive resistance
techniques, and rural grassroots sharecroppers unwilling to
continue bowing to suppression and degradation by the white
power establishment. As Berg (2005, p. 159) stated: “In
order to overcome the lamentable state of apathy among
potential black voters, the NAACP activists tried to make
clear that political powerlessness and economic and social
discrimination were two sides of he same coin”. Nossiter
(1994, p. 40) documented, “By the mid-1940’s the NAACP was
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an accepted part of the national political landscape,
recognized as the premier advocate for black advancement”.
The murder of fourteen year old Emmett Till in Money,
Mississippi for allegedly whistling at the wife of a white
drug store owner also helped create unity within the black
community, important because it signified cultural
collectivism in the face of oppression, and a need to stand
together in defense of blacks’ rights (Berg, 2005; Crowe,
2003; Williams, 1986). Although Till’s murderers were
acquitted by an all-white jury, Till’s uncle had the
courage to testify against two white men in a Mississippi
court of law.
Blacks were able to accomplish equal protection rights
gradually as litigation moved slowly through the court
system from 1954-64 (Irons, 2002; Tushnet, 1987).
Recognition as a minority group may have contributed to
some societal accommodations. Public opinion after World
War II emerged to acknowledge blacks were a minority group
that had been disenfranchised and excluded from general
society (Kluger, 2004). Society owed them accommodations
based upon wrongs inflicted from the past. However,
scholars have over emphasized the value of this minority
labeling as this chapter will highlight below.
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Minority Labeling for the Disabled – Competing Philosophies
Scholars previously mentioned who were in agreement
about minority status with blacks struggled whether the
designation applied to the disabled population.
Unfortunately, they wasted forty years of debate over a
question that was unimportant for two reasons. First,
minority status never was a significant factor when judges
and legislators made determinations about due process for
the disabled. Second, individuality and sensitivity to
specific physical, mental, and learning disabilities were
key to producing due process rights by the late 1960’s.
Nevertheless, it is necessary to review the argument so
that scholars now may understand how previous theoretical
ideas obstructed the true relationship between the BCRM and
the DRM, and how disability rights legislation was created.
The importance of this relationship occurred prior to the
Brown case, not in the era following it.
A review of key literature of minority labeling for
disabled people was not unanimous and only evolved over a
generation (1948-73). The notion of the disabled increasing
their normality to compete with normal people on a normal
playing field permeated psychology in the first half of the
twentieth century in articles by psychologists like Sigmund
Freud, John Watson and in the 1940’s and 1950’s by
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behaviorists like B. F. Skinner. According to Barker,
(1948) the disabled individual was not considered a
minority group like a Jew or Negro because according to
Barker (1948) he did not share a minority position with
other similar individuals: “He is almost inevitably an
isolated individual who must meet the limitations which his
underprivileged status imposes without the possibility of
group support” (p. 32). This position came into sharper
focus when it became clear that disabled people were
“spread across the various social classes and status groups
in society”, (Scotch, 2001, p. 30) and that the disabled
actually composed a cross-section of economic life in
America, (Scotch, 1989, pp. 380-399) more so than did
blacks.
People with disabilities were isolated from each other
for two reasons. First, they were usually living with
families and out of touch with other disabled people, and
second, they possessed a plethora of different disability
types. According to Scotch (2001, p. 30) “Disability is an
individual experience in most cases, and a community of
disabled people may not exist unless it is consciously
built”. It was evident to several scholars (Switzer, 2003;
Gilson and Depoy, 2000; Covey, 1998) that disabled people
did not consider themselves unified members with other

	
  

	
  

40	
  

disability groups or united to a common cause. Switzer
(2003, p. 14), for example, commented, “The lack of this
common culture isolated the handicapped from each other,
and the isolation was exacerbated by the fact that the
handicapped differed greatly among themselves…” Scotch
(1989) asserted that it was not until the early 1970’s that
the name disability rights movement (DRM) emerged. At that
time Seelman (1993, p. 122) contended “The leadership came
from the ranks of people with disabilities who coalesced
around a common experience of oppression”.
Disabled individuals were unable to immediately
benefit from the collective consciousness of the BCRM
despite testimony to this effect by textbook authors,
because there was no evidence they formed any cohesive
groups or shared communication of their issues. As Mary
Jane Owen lamented in “The Ragged Edge”, an edited journal
for the disabled that began publication in 1984, disabled
people were like “squabbling cubs”. “Why don’t we seem to
“get it together” the way other civil rights movements
have?” (Shaw, 1994, p.7). Evidence of non-recognition of
minority status had been advanced by Osborne, (1996, p. 3)
who noted for parents and advocates of disabled children,
“The federal government did not require states to provide
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special education services to students with disabilities
until 1974”.
As previously stated, scholars in key literature
recognized that the DRM was influenced by actions,
emotions, and events generated by the BCRM (Rothman, 2003;
Scotch, 2001; Bryan, 1996; Osbourne Jr., 1996; Turnbull
III, 1986). However, they cited Brown as the instigating
event and failed to document the influence of the BCRM
prior to Brown. They failed to do this because they chose
to categorize each movement as a group with a collective
consciousness, when, unlike the unified consciousness of
blacks, a collective consciousness had not developed within
the DRM until the early 1970’s, when several cases in
litigation, that will be discussed later in this chapter,
occurred. Some scholars failed to make the connection that
successful DRM litigation was the result of precedence
established by successful equal protection cases advanced
by the BCRM from 1948-50.
When scholars referred to Brown as a catalyst for a
right to education for the disabled, they stressed the
legal argument of class action and minority rights that
allowed five cases to be bundled in one hearing as Brown by
the Supreme Court. However, lost in the reasoning in Brown,
along racial lines, was the loss of equal protection to the
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direct petitioner’s involved. This individuality had been
stressed in Gaines, Sipuel, McLaurin, and Sweat by the
Justices, and generated a significant reasoning for their
holding in the Brown decision (Brown v. Board of Education,
(1954)).
Later litigation by the DRM in the PARC and Mills
cases, which will be elaborated below, made reference to
Brown, not because of the class action argument, but
because Brown had demonstrated denial of equal protection
to distinct individuals. Litigation in DRM cases referred
to the “intangible considerations” lost with segregation
(Brown v. Board of Education (1954), p. 4). This loss was
personal in nature and became the basis of argument in DRM
litigation, the distinct character and value of the
individual. The holding in the Mills case, citing Brown,
identified that a privilege granted to one person should
not be denied to another when it read, “Such an
opportunity, where the state has undertaken to provide it,
is a right which must be made available to all on equal
terms” (Mills v. D.C. (1972), p. 9). This was the language
of the Sipuel and Sweatt cases. So when scholars like
Turnbull III and Osbourne Jr. cited Brown as the catalyst
that propelled education for the disabled, their
identification was correct, but they did not examine more
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completely the individuality argument as well as class
action.
Several scholars assumed a seamless transition of
acquisition of due process occurred for the disabled only
following the Brown case. On the other hand, others like
Covey (1998) and Charlton (1998) maintained due process
rights for the disabled did not seamlessly follow the
successes blacks achieved in the early 1950’s because the
disabled lacked the unified community spirit (Covey, 1998)
and the recognized minority status (Charlton, 1998) blacks
had achieved through their long historical fight against
Jim Crow. Neither of these theories is correct because they
failed to address the individuality and personal experience
of the disabled as an individual. Previous scholars have
failed to recognize the lack of importance or the
irrelevancy of linkage between societal acceptance of
minority status and eventual success at achieving due
process.
Scholars instead chose to examine this importance of
establishing one’s self as a minority and its linkage
toward attaining due process. This argument consumed a
twenty-five year period from 1948-73 and is actually
insignificant because it disassociates due process from the
personal, individual right of an individual by categorizing
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it on an impersonal group or race basis. The argument
supporting or denying minority status is specious and
unnecessary in discussing the BCRM/DRM relationship,
nevertheless, it occupied copious amounts of literature.
The number of scholars who maintained the argument
that one difficulty disabled individuals faced was lack of
recognition as a minority group both by themselves and
society was pervasive {Switzer, 2003; Mansbridge & Morris,
2001; Bryan, 1996; Nagler, 1993). Nagler (1993, p. 33)
stated that the disabled did not constitute a
“group in the sociological sense…Differing in a
sociological sense from other groups, the disabled do
not have constituents such as a common culture, mores,
folkways, laws, and a sense of ‘peoplehood’”. They
lacked an‘esprit de corps’ that is necessary for group
consciousness.
Mansbridge and Morris (2001, p. 95) concurred in this
finding. “Lacking the necessary structural and cultural
conditions, individuals with disabilities did not form a
broad-based oppositional consciousness until the early
1970’s”. Richard Scotch, often recognized as the foremost
scholar of the Disability Rights Movement and public policy
since writing his Harvard doctoral dissertation in 1984,
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did believe the disabled possessed a social movement at
least by 1962. According to Switzer (2003, p. 71)
“Scotch believes that until the mid-1970’s the
disability rights movement was a loosely structured
grassroots movement. There were few resources
available, “leadership by example”, and only
occasional focusing events that brought activists
together. He noted that there are no aggregate data on
individual or organizational participants in the
disability rights movement…”.
Two Treatment Models for the Disabled
The battle of existence of collective identity and
whether disabled people should passively accept their
disability or whether society should accommodate to a
disability grew intense after Roger Barker (1948, pp. 2837) first addressed the issue of a collective consciousness
among the disabled in an article entitled The Social
Psychology of Physical Disability in the Journal of Social
Issues in 1948. In constructing what he referred to as a
“medical model”, Barker claimed disabled people were a
minority-group, but whether they possessed a collective
will to constitute what Scotch (1989) would later call a
“social movement” depended upon their psychological
response to their environmental condition; their
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understanding that they live in a “built” world of
physical, social, and emotional barriers to which they must
adapt to be accepted into a general societal framework.
What he meant was that although the disabled saw themselves
as different from normal people, they had accepted their
inequality and expected to be treated unequally by
mainstream culture. Therefore, they were resigned to their
inferiority status. This resignation would better help them
integrate to their condition in society.
This perspective was still alive but faintly breathing
by 1988 when Fine and Asch (1988) were two of the last
proponents to revive this psychological/medical framework
of minority group by referencing a statement by Meyerson in
the same 1948 Journal of Social Issues “that the problems
of the handicapped are not physical, but social and
psychological” (p. 7). This implied that disabled
individuals as a distinct minority would have to
psychologically accept their condition as medically
incompetent in an environment that existed as reality. They
had to conform to the general culture rather than insist
the general culture create accommodations for their
acceptance. However, oppositional viewpoints during the
years following Barker’s view expounded below by other
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scholars had determined this medical model was dead on
arrival by the 1970’s.
Scotch, (1989, p. 381) of course, disagreed with this
medical model framework. Rather, he claimed that society
was responsible for adapting to the disabled. “The disabled
constituted a social movement because they met criteria of
collectivity acting with some continuity to promote or
resist change in the society or group of which it is a
part”. Evidence of this collectivity and society’s
responsiveness occurred when Ed Roberts formed the Center
for Independent Living (CIL) and fought for more
independent housing at Berkeley. Additionally, Judy
Heumann, previously a disabled second grade teacher turned
community activist, was able to organize a group that
engineered a sit-in at President Nixon’s re-election
headquarters in 1972 to protest better transportation for
disabled workers.
Sharon Groch (Mansbridge & Morris, 2001, p. 65)
reinforced the notion of collective consciousness and
community responsibility to accommodation by insisting the
disabled met five criteria for oppositional consciousness
that beckoned for accommodation because they: 1) see
themselves as members of a group, 2) regard their life
situation as unjust, 3) find common interest with other
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group members to oppose the injustice, 4) regard the
injustice is due to structural inequalities, and 5) believe
the justice can be terminated or diminished by collective
action. She was able to cite as evidence that the disabled
demanded accommodations in the strike against public
transportation in Denver in 1978 because of a lack of
wheelchair lifts on buses.
Consequently, according to the viewpoints of Scotch
and Groch, it can be argued that it was society that must
accommodate to the individual needs of the disability to
promote more inclusion, not the individual’s responsibility
to succumb and to accept the existing environment. Covey
(1998, p. 3) supported this notion by stating, “A handicap
is not determined by an individual’s physical limitations,
but instead reflects the social consequences of that
disability”.
Adding to the confusion of identity awareness, Gilson
and Depoy (2000, p. 211) took a double-sided approach that
“disability identity can be viewed as internally derived or
externally imposed depending on definitional lenses”. From
this perspective, Fine & Asch (1988) and Barker (1948) have
argued that society can impose a medical model of
constriction on the disabled individual where he must
measure up to societal norms in order to join. On the other
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hand, other scholars who supported Scotch and Groch
maintained the collective identity model. A disabled person
can create a collective identity with like-minded disabled
others to form a social movement that challenges the
majority to make accommodations so they may enter it
(Switzer, 2003; Mansbridge & Morris, 2003; Bryan, 1996;
Zola, 1989).
James Charlton (1998, pp. 83-84) in his book Nothing
About Us Without Us made a strong statement that disabled
people should control their own destiny in society, but
society owes them the right to compete with necessary
accommodations. According to Charlton, disabled individuals
were faced with seven features of societal oppression in
everyday life: 1) invisibility, 2) lack of support
services, 3) control by charities, 4) hierarchy of
disabilities, 5) vulnerability to violence, 6)
inaccessibility, and 7) chasm between rural and urban life.
In his view, mainstream society must initiate an attitude
adjustment to even the playing field for disabled people.
Finally, researchers like Switzer (2003), Gilson &
Depoy, (2000) Scotch, (1989) Bryan, (2002; 1996) and Zola
(1989) pointed out, that beginning in the 1960’s, members
of the disabled became more familiar with the collective
consciousness of other social movements such as the Anti-
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War, Women’s, Gay Right’s, Latino, etc. The notion that
disabled people could constitute a collective consciousness
with power to demand societal accommodations began to
outweigh the medical group model previously advocated by
Barker, and Fine and Asch: minorities must psychologically
adjust to the environment they faced.
As Gilson & Depoy (2000, p. 208) noted citing French,
“A social model of disability is socially constructed…a
social model of disability sets service goals as removal of
social and environmental barriers to full social, physical,
career and spiritual participation.
Unimportance of Minority Status
Despite twenty-five years of rhetoric of who
constituted minority status, I have discovered the issue
had no bearing when blacks sought equal protection or the
disabled due process. What mattered more was the personal
denial of civil rights to the individual. Blacks obtained
justice from the Supreme Court from key Court cases that
occurred between 1948-50, which will be explained below.
Advocates of the disabled were able to utilize holdings
from those cases to emphasize due process for the
individual. The history of the Brown case (Brown v. Board
of Education (1954)) will be studied to demonstrate that it
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was not the defining case for due process of the disabled
that most scholars have interpreted.
History of Brown and the Legal Defense Team
That the Brown case ever reached the Supreme Court in
the spring of 1954 is testimony to a group of highly
talented black lawyers who struggled throughout the 1940’s
against racial subordination. They worked for the Legal
Defense Team of the National Association for the
Advancement of Colored People, an organization founded in
1909 “by a biracial group desiring to counter an increase
in white violence against blacks throughout the country”
(Tushnet, 1987, p. 1). Proof that the NAACP Legal Defense
Team was instrumental in bringing black civil rights to the
forefront within the federal court system was Walter’s
(1992) claim that prior to action by the NAACP beginning in
the 1940’s, “There are no known efforts of blacks in
Mississippi to integrate public places other than a boycott
of public transportation in 1904”, (p. 91) an effort that
failed because blacks had no support in the courts. Watson
(2010 p. 41) indicated that while Mississippi’s population
in 1900 was 62.5 percent black, “the state had not one
black elected official”. Vann Woodword (1966) indicated in
his book, The Strange Career of Jim Crow that white power
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in the state of Mississippi was absolute – a complete
police state for blacks.
Beginning in the 1930’s, acting secretary of the
NAACP, Walter White, assembled a talented team of black
attorneys, mostly graduates of Howard University, to
represent the organization “for an intensive campaign
against specific handicaps facing the Negro” in the area of
segregation (Tushnet, 1987, p. 15). According to Anderson
and Byrne, (2004, p. 27) lawyer Nathan Margold was hired to
develop a “strategy to positively affect the legal status
of blacks in the United States”. The plan, known as the
Margold Report, was designed to be an all out attack
against racial segregation in the Jim Crow South.
As Anderson and Byrne (2004, p. 27) reported, White
hired Charles Houston, Dean of Howard University’s law
school, to represent the NAACP’s legal defense team
permanently in 1935 to litigate “planned test cases across
the country to generate favorable legal precedents”. By
1950 the team had added two highly competent attorneys and
graduates of Howard University, Robert L. Carter and
Thurgood Marshall They had argued four equal protection
cases from 1948-50 where blacks had been denied higher
education. However, as Irons discovered, (2002, p. 12) if
blacks would be successful at acquiring equal protection
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rights,

“The heart of the Jim Crow system, and the

institution most central to its functioning was the public
School system”.
Under Charles Houston’s guidance it was Redding,
Carter, Marshall, and Spottswood Robinson, another gifted
black attorney, who argued a series of bundled cases, two
from Delaware and one each from Virginia, South Carolina,
and the District of Columbia known as Brown v. Board of
Education ( Kluger, 2004; Irons, 2002). Richard Kluger
(2004) eminently described the case in his book Simple
Justice. These cases centered upon petitioners who
represented model clients: employed, middle class, hard
working, stable family structure, and respected in the
community. According to Irons (2002) and Tushnet, (1987)
race had been the exclusionary factor in denying inclusion
in the K-12 public schools. However, equal protection cases
argued by the Legal Defense Team were decided by
acknowledging personal individuality as well as race.
Several civil rights authors (Anderson and Byrne,
2004; Gray, 2002; Irons, 2002; Tushnet, 1987) have argued
that attorneys were critical at pressing for individual
rights and dignity for black people, coordinating organized
local resistance to segregationist policies, and appealing
this resistance through federal courts. Tushnet (1987, p.
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145) noted how Lawyers for the NAACP “identified not a
single target but a group of generically defined evils --school segregation, lynch law, Jim Crow laws --- and
directed its efforts at those broadly defined evils”. The
Court agreed to hear these cases collectively on December
9-11, 1953.
Byrnes and Anderson (2004, p. 29) reported “This
grouping was significant because it showed that school
segregation was a national issue, not just a southern one”.
Anderson and Byrnes (2004) and Tushnet (1987)) reasoned
that to strengthen its case, the NAACP Legal Defense Team
presented plaintiffs who possessed credibility, and they
would likely impress liberal justices with their high moral
character, family values, and strong work ethic. Irons
(2002) maintained the credibility of plaintiffs in the
Brown case had a profound effect on how the justices viewed
segregated education.
The Supreme Court justices ruled 9-0 in favor of the
plaintiffs. Their equal protection rights were being denied
because of race. While Turnbull III (1986) indicated race
appeared to be a hot-button issue that excluded disabled
children could utilize in their fight for inclusion, key
literature (Hardeman et al., 2008; Gearheart et al., 1996)
did not support that a great degree of movement toward
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inclusion of the disabled in public schools occurred
following Brown.
Impact on the DRM
Both Cremins (1983) and Turnbull III (1986) noted that
this judgment had no immediate effect upon disabled
students other than to demonstrate to their advocates that
litigation and not legislation would be the initial avenue
for them to pursue due process and inclusion. Advocates
realized skillful attorneys as demonstrated by the Legal
Defense Team would be valuable assets in the fight for due
process. What Brown did demonstrate was that equal
protection under the Fourteenth Amendment was a culmination
of several prior cases that the Legal Defense Team had
adjudicated between 1948-1950.
Yet educational and historical scholars (Kluger, 2004;
Daugherty, 2001; Kirk, 2000; Payne, 1995; Branch, 1998;
Tushnet, 1987) have noted little linkage between these
earlier cases in regard to the BCRM’s relationship to what
would become the DRM.

These scholars have detailed how an

emphasis on the BCRM and its effects on other movements
have often centered on its tactics such as demonstrations,
marches, sit-ins, and boycotts and the leadership ability
of able preachers of noted divinity schools like Martin
Luther King Jr., Rev. Ralph Abernathy, Rev. Fred
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Shuttlesworth, and blacks in leadership positions with
positive ties to the white community like A. Phillip
Randolph (Porters’ Union) and E. D. Nixon (Montgomery
NAACP). While the DRM was propelled to emulate the tactics
and leadership of the BCRM in its early years, its success
at achieving due process for disabled students resulted
initially from resorting to litigation in a similar fashion
as the BCRM had employed prior to Brown, stressing personal
rights of the individual. Scholars who narrated this did
not particularly denote it (Osbourne Jr., 1996; Turnbull
III, 1986; Cremins, 1983). As an example, in the Wyatt v.
Hardin (1967) case in Alabama, the district court ordered
the institution housing mentally challenged individuals to
uphold what became known as “Wyatt Standards”, one of which
required “individual treatment plans” (Wyatt v. Alabama,
1967, p. 5).
Precedent Cases in the BCRM Prior to Brown
As previously argued, one reason why the DRM developed
gradually was Switzer’s (2002) contention of the slow
transformation of disabled people toward classconsciousness. A second reason was Gilson and Depoy’s
(2000) supposition of society’s slow movement of evolving
expectancies of disabled people from paternalistic to
independent. However, Scotch (2001) and Percy (1989)
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indicated that leadership also affected how and when the
disabled fought for their civil rights. Whereas a legal
team of attorneys represented blacks, together with key
preachers who were scholars of divinity schools with black
church congregations where they could express their views,
leaders of the DRM were middle class white college
students, from both Coasts fighting for their individual
and local interests (Scotch, 1989). It can be argued
(Irons, 2002; Payne, 1995; Branch 1987) that blacks were
unified in their mission to achieve equal protection and
overcome Jim Crow Laws, while leaders of the DRM sought to
overcome localized, personal difficulties like access to
housing, mobility, and meaningful employment (Disability
Rights and Independent Living Movement, 2009; Roberts,
2007; A Discussion with Judy Heumann on Independent Living,
2008).
Judy Heumann related how in fighting for her teacher’s
license she learned “when you begin to push, push, push, in
many cases you can beat the system” (Heumann, 2008 p. 10).
Leadership and localism of issues affected the speed of
progress toward due process for the DRM. In the PARC (1972)
and Mills (1972) cases leaders did however, copy the legal
tactics of respect for the individual and the intrinsically
personal nature of equal protection employed by the BCRM in
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a series of cases from 1948-50, once lobbying groups for
the DRM acquired enough political and public support to
challenge the status quo during the period 1969-72. These
cases will be itemized below.
BCRM Supreme Court Decisions Prior to Brown
As early as 1938, the Supreme Court addressed the
equal protection clause of the Fourteenth Amendment in
exclusion of blacks in the nation’s schools of higher
education in Gaines v Canada (Gaines v Canada, 1938).
William Hogsett and Fred L. Williams of the Legal Defense
Team argued the case. Lloyd Gaines was a student who had
earned a Bachelor’s degree from an all black College and
sought to enter the University of Missouri Law School. A
state statute offered to pay tuition for admission to a law
school in an adjoining state, but did not allow admission
of black students into Missouri’s law school. The Supreme
Court struck down the state statute by reversing the
decision of the District Court. Denying Gaines admission to
Missouri’s law school amounted to violation of his equal
protection rights. While Gaines was permitted to enroll,
the issue was moot according to Irons, (2002) when Gaines
moved away from Missouri and the state was never faced with
the physical reality of providing a law school for members
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of the black race or integrating its current white law
school.
Building from the precedent of the Gaines case,
Thurgood Marshall and Amos T. Hall argued Sipuel v. Board
of Regents of University of Oklahoma (1948) before the
Supreme Court, a similar case where a black female was
denied entrance to the University of Oklahoma Law School
solely because of race. The Court ruled “The state must
provide it to her in conformity with the equal protection
clause of the Fourteenth Amendment and provide it as soon
as it does for applicants of any other group” (Sipuel v.
Oklahoma, 1948) p. 1). Significantly, the Court ruled that
denial of equal protection rights to this petitioner was a
personal affront, not just an injustice because of race.
This ruling recognized the value of the individual for
herself, not just because she was a member of a group or
race. The Legal Defense Team with Marshall in charge chose
to pursue other cases where denial of higher education was
involved (Irons, 2002; Tushnet, 1987).
Two additional cases were argued on the same day in
the 1950 term of the Supreme Court, both similar in their
legal demands. Robert L. Carter in the lead with Thurgood
Marshall, Amos T. Hall and three other members of the Legal
Defense Team providing counsel on the brief, argued
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McLaurin v. Oklahoma (1950). This case involved a black
doctoral student at the University of Oklahoma who was
allowed to attend with white students, but was required to
be segregated from them in his seating, studying, and
eating environments. The Court addressed the specific
question “whether a state may, after admitting a student to
graduate instruction in its state university, afford him
different treatment from other students solely because of
his race” (McLaurin v. Oklahoma (1950) p. 2).
The Court held that separating McLaurin from his
fellow students infringed upon his ability to learn and
“deprived him of his personal and present (author’s
italics) right to the equal protection of the laws; and the
Fourteenth Amendment precludes such differences in
treatment by the State based upon race” (p. 1). This was a
personal affront to his dignity as an individual. He was
allowed to join his fellow white students. However,
justices had noted this personal affront to him, and this
holding was important because it was not determined purely
on race.
Similarly, in Sweatt v. Painter (1950) Thurgood
Marshall, Robert L. Carter, and others on the Legal Defense
Team argued that a Texas law student was denied his equal
protection rights when he was denied admission to the
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University of Texas law school in exchange for the state’s
creation of a Negro law school. They argued, again, that
the plaintiff had been denied equal protection. The Court
ruled the University of Texas law school was inherently
superior to the newly created black law school. Therefore
the separate but equal argument of Plessy v. Ferguson
(1896) did not apply. Chief Justice Vinson, speaking for
the majority was careful to point out in his holding that
this was a narrowly defined case based upon the two cases,
Gaines and Sipuel, “which present the issue of the
constitutional validity of race distinctions in statesupported graduate and professional education” (Sweatt v.
Painter (1950) p. 3). However, the Court recognized again
the personal nature of rights when Justice Vinson stated:
“”It is fundamental that these cases concern rights which
are personal and present” (author’s italics). Significance
lay in that the court recognized denial of equal protection
affected the life of the individual and constituted more
than a race based obstruction.
From these successes, Tushnet (1987) related that the
NAACP had learned equal protection for blacks in higher
education could be obtained through the nation’s courts
through specific incidents when the issue of equal
protection was personal and narrowly defined to pertain to

	
  

	
  

62	
  

a specific individual. As Irons (2002) documented, by the
early 1950’s, the Legal Defense Team realized if it
intended to attack exclusion and segregation at a broader
community level, it would have to create a series of cases
at a lower educational level where a multitude of black
children existed. This would be the K-12 grade level at
regular public schools. Eventually, five cases bundled
together are what became Brown v. Board of Education
(1954).
Due Process Supreme Court Decisions for Disability Rights
While no immediate litigation success occurred for due
process for educating disabled students from 1954-70,
nevertheless, according to Cremins, (1983, p. 15) “It was a
time of active parent organization, federal intervention,
evolution of more and better preparation programs,
research, etc.” Parent lobbying groups proliferated,
especially among parents of students with intellectual
impairments.
The first major breakthrough for inclusion of disabled
students occurred in Utah when parents filed suit against
the state for denying two children with intellectual
impairments admission to public school (Wolf v. Utah,
1969). Here Osbourne (1996) argued, “The court in Wolf
declared that children who were mentally retarded were

	
  

	
  

63	
  

entitled to a free appropriate public education under the
state constitution” (Osbourne Jr., 1996, p. 8). Osbourne
Jr. demonstrated how current scholars like himself have
missed the importance and impact of decisions like Gaines,
Sipuel, McLaurin, and Sweatt prior to Brown that emphasized
the personal and individualistic rights of the minority
person rather than the class action remedy of Brown when he
stated about the Wolf case, “The Court’s opinion reads
remarkably similar to portions of the Brown desegregation
opinion” (p. 8). By missing the relationship of Wolf to
prior Brown cases, Osbourne Jr. failed to discern that
success at litigation to achieve due process for the
disabled depended on courts identifying with the individual
rights of a single person, not necessarily identifying with
class action suits in favor of a race or group.
Success in the prior Brown cases was more effective in
encouraging parents of the disabled to press for due
process in their individual cases, although I have failed
to discern in key literature any scholars who identified
this strategy. Thus while scholars have emphasized Brown as
a climactic case that opened the door of inclusion for
other groups like the disabled, Brown could more correctly
be described as a case that eliminated race and minority
status as reasons for exclusion, and these two factors were
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instrumental for this case to reach the supreme Court. I
maintain that prior Brown cases that documented
infringement of individual equal protection rights were
more effective precedents for the disabled in their
subsequent litigation. These cases were based upon
infringement on a present, personal, and individualized
basis.
Political Support
According to many scholars, (Hardman et. al., 2008;
Switzer, 2003; Fleischer & Zames, 2001; Scotch, 2001;
Kaplan, 1996; Percy, 1989) despite the influence of the
BCRM, the DRM may not have pursued litigation for due
process if the political will within the country had not
existed in the 1960’s. According to Hardeman et al., (2008)
mental retardation received prominent exposure with the
election of John F. Kennedy in 1960 because Kennedy’s
sister, Rose, was intellectually challenged. After his
election, Kennedy listened to science experts who
recommended alternative living programs to supplant the
stodgy, unsuccessful benign neglect programs of the 1950’s,
that continued to leave the intellectually challenged
institutionalized. Having proposed an alternative competing
philosophy for more productive lives for the disabled,
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Kennedy sought to deinstitutionalize intellectually
impaired patients.
Many state institutions for the mentally challenged
were closed during the 1960’s (Hardeman, 2008). Kennedy
created the American Association on Mental Retardation
(AAMR) and appointed Senator Hubert Humphrey as its first
chairman. The President’s sister, Eunice Shriver, founded
Special Olympics for disabled children. Consequently,
disabled people were in the national consciousness, seen as
individuals who could be productive, who could accomplish
tasks if given opportunities. The House of Representatives
conducted hearings in 1972, (U. S. House of
Representatives, Committee on Education and Labor,
Subcommittee on Select Education, 1972) and acknowledged
awareness of 40 million Americans with mental and physical
handicaps who were underperforming economically in America.
Rothstein (2000, p. 12) documented that “of the more than
eight million children with disabilities in the United
States, more than half were receiving either inappropriate
or no educational service”. Advocates were able to gain
significant attention to their lack of inclusiveness from
legislators and courts by flooding U.S. district courts
with due process cases from 1967-72 (Osbourne, Jr., 1996).
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According to Scotch, (2001, p. 37) “In addition to grass-

roots advocacy and legislative activity, the federal courts
became an arena for efforts to establish the rights of
disabled people”. As lobbying groups for individuals with
intellectual impairments gained more influence by 1970,
they instituted litigation against school districts that
refused to admit disabled students (Daugherty, 2001).
Covey 1998) unfortunately missed the legal argument of
individuality and loss of personal rights when he cited
that advocates for the disabled saw themselves as a
minority group similar to racial minorities who had been
denied access to public education in the 1950’s, and they
had used many of the same legal arguments against
segregation blacks had used in Brown. However, he missed
the point of the argument because once their cases were
addressed, legal arguments in Wyatt, Diana, Wolf, PARC, and
Mills actually centered on the personal rights of the
individual. Scholars like Covey, who briefly summarized
results of the litigation, have overlooked the importance
of personal rights of the individual in these cases.
There were several examples where federal district and
appellate courts ruled in favor of Fourteenth Amendment
equal protection rights for the disabled. A Federal Appeals
Court in Alabama, for example, under Judge Frank Johnson
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ruled against Alabama state institutions for the mentally
retarded for indiscriminate housing of mental impairment
individuals (Wyatt v Hardin, 1971). This was seen as a
breach of their constitutional right to receive treatment
that would give them a realistic chance to be cured or to
improve their mental condition (Irons, 2002). The ruling
considered the individual member within the institution and
that person’s individual need rather than the
categorization of a group with intellectual impairments. It
was ironic that Johnson was the same appellate judge who
had previously mandated integration of James Meredith to
Ole Miss in 1962.
In a similar case in California, when mentally challenged
students of color were overly represented in special
education classes in California, parents were able to
insist that students must be tested in their native or
primary language for potential placement in a special
education program as a distinct individual, not as a member
of a specific racial or minority disability group. (Diane v
California State Board of Education, 1970). What is
important is for scholars to recognize that litigation for
the disabled from 1967 onwards always followed a legal
argument that rights for the individual were paramount, not
rights for a group or race.
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Beginnings of Leadership for the DRM
Prior to Brown, Scotch (1989; 2001) indicated
that leadership of the disabled consisted of benevolent and
charitable organizations absent any disabled individuals.
Subsequent to Brown, a small cadre of disabled people drew
inspiration from successes they observed from the BCRM. Ed
Roberts, who will be depicted below, had stated: “I’m tired
of well meaning noncripples {sic} with their stereotypes of
what I can and cannot do directing my life and my future”
(The Father of Independent Living, 2007, p. 2).
Ed Roberts was representative of leaders of the DRM.
He was a polio victim, disabled, white, college educated,
and upper middle class. When he enrolled at the University
of California at Berkeley in 1962, he was housed in the
campus medical facility at Cowell Hall with other disabled
students, a restrictive setting, where students were unable
to perform living tasks with any degree of independence.
While at Berkeley he fought to improve housing independence
for the disabled. According to a biographical piece, (Ed
Roberts, “The Father of Independent Living”, 2007, p. 1)
“Ed was quick to grasp that the struggle for independence
was not a medical or functional issue, but rather a
sociological, political, and civil rights struggle”.
Roberts sought to develop a “self help movement that would
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radicalize how people with disabilities perceived
themselves” (2007, p. 2).
After establishing a campus organization for housing
for the disabled, Roberts created an off campus community
organization in Berkeley called the Center for Independent
Living (CIL). CIL housed disabled individuals who wished to
perform practical living skills more independently. After
establishing a successful center for a number of years,
California Governor Jerry Brown appointed him director of
the state’s Vocational Rehabilitation Agency for housing in
1975.
Judy Heumann is also attributed as a beginning leader
of the DRM based on her personal desire to become a New
York City elementary teacher and the physical barriers
imposed against her to prevent her from achieving that goal
(McMahon and Shaw, 2000 p. 87-106). Heumann was a
graduating senior with a teaching degree in May 1970 when
she experienced difficulty obtaining her New York State
teaching license. According to her interview, (A Discussion
with Judy Heumann, 2008) She had successfully completed the
necessary twelve academic credits, passed the oral and
written exam, but failed the physical exam miserably
because she was a victim of polio in a wheelchair.
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Convinced she was a victim of discrimination, she was
determined to receive her license.
She contacted the American Civil Liberties Union
(ACLU) and consulted a friend who was a reporter for The
New York Times. The Times sent a reporter to record her
story. A few days later an editorial appeared entitled:
“You Can Be President, Not Teacher, with Polio (McMahon &
Shaw, 2000, p. 97). The publicity helped her secure her
license and a second grade-teaching job.
More important, Heumann transitioned from teacher to
advocate of the disabled. She founded Disabled In Action
(DIA) in 1971, a support group for the disabled in
Brooklyn, New York by networking with other disabled
individuals who also experienced discrimination in
employment. Through a series of meetings over several
months, DIA was launched. Members grew more and more active
and advocated for curb cuts and ramps to gain physical
accessibility. “The group demonstrated against the Jerry
Lewis telethon with its “Give it to the poor, pitiful,
handicapped children” theme” (McMahon & Shaw, 2000, p. 99).
Influenced by the work of Ed Roberts in the San
Francisco Bay area, Heumann accepted Ed Robert’s invitation
to join him on the CIL staff. Together they helped unite
disabled people of California fighting for independent
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living.

According to Heumann’s account, (A Discussion with

Judy Heumann on Independent Living, 2008) they challenged
the California Vocational Rehabilitation Agency in the
early 1970’s to strengthen its employment program when it
was apparent the need for employment of the disabled was
not being sufficiently met.
Heumann used her skills as an advocate to lobby
California legislators to pass CIL legislation. By 1977 she
had risen to Assistant Secretary of Health, Education, and
Welfare (HEW) in the Carter Administration. Success in
California had led to passage of federal CIL legislation in
Washington in 1978. Heumann from the east coast and Roberts
from the west coast had brought the issue of due process
rights for the disabled into public view, and more
importantly, to enactment of federal legislation, which
will be discussed below.
According to the Disability Rights and Independent
Living Movement (DRILM) (The Bancroft Library, 2004, p. 13) leadership of the DRM in the 1960’s surfaced on the East
and West Coasts, Chicago, Texas, and Washington D. C. out
of basic local needs of housing, transportation, and
mobility to secure employment. These individuals were not
members of a mass movement such as the BCRM, and they did
not constitute an organizational chain of command with
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various organizational strands and membership. These
leaders were responding to local conditions where their
independent living was jeopardized. According to Scotch
(2001) and Fleischer and Zames, (2001) they sought to
compete with normal society where accommodations would
enable them access to employment, housing, transportation,
and leisure on an equal and individualized basis; where
recognition of their disability entailed due process and
inclusion within normal society. According to Fleischer and
Zames, (2001) they sought a hand up rather than a hand out,
but most of all dignity rather than pity.
Leaders of the DRM, who sought to increase their
independence by improving their personal housing,
transportation, and access to the environment, were faced
with “biting the hand that fed them” because according to
Percy (1989) demands for power, independence, and inclusion
often clashed with powerlessness, dependence, and
segregation associated with accepting charity. Yet without
this charity, they were unable to compete in a normal world
as Barker had constructed. While they worked to increase
their independence and inclusion on local issues, they had
no synchronization of organization.

Therefore, according

to Rothman, (2003) Scotch, (2001; 1989) and Percy (1989)
there was no mass movement of disability rights advocates
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as there was for black civil rights during the 1950’s and
early 1960’s, only localized areas where proponents
operated without knowledge of others’ movements.
According to these scholars, the DRM had no united
grass roots movement from the bottom-up as had the BCRM.
However, civil rights for the disabled had caught the
attention of some major Congressional leaders, influenced
by Robert’s and Heumann’s personal stories. Senate leaders
(U.S. Senate Committee on Labor and Public Welfare,
Subcommittee on the Handicapped, pp. 1-28, 1973) considered
it imperative that more productivity should be brought
forth for the nation’s 30 million disabled individuals by
amending the 1972 Education of the Handicapped Act. The
Subcommittee heard testimony that raising economic
productivity of the disabled was a basic civil right.
Now that disability terminology was linked to civil
rights rather than entitlement rights, the 93rd Congress
(U.S. Senate Committee on Labor and Public Welfare,
Subcommittee on the Handicapped, 1973 pp.1-701) also
recognized the disabled as a distinct minority class. This
contentious although inconsequential designation was
finally determined.
I deduce these Congressional leaders became more
responsive to the federal government’s involvement in due
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process for the disabled when they admitted the linkage
between civil rights and a minority group, although this
linkage and its association with Brown’s legal argument was
irrelevant and distracting to the actual argument of
individual needs. Congress hoped that by creating
legislation that produced greater inclusiveness, disabled
individuals would deliver an economic payback once they
were able to develop and display their skills and
expertise.
However, with more opportunity came the necessity of
societal accommodations so disabled individuals could
compete with normal society (Kaplan, 1996). In their review
of public policy toward the disabled, Scotch, (2001)
Fleischer and Zames, (2001) and Percy (1989) corroborated
that to increase societal involvement for the disabled
meant that accommodations were essential, so the disabled
could acquire access and mobility to produce economic
performance. Foremost among societal inclusion was
education.
Major DRM Due Process Cases
Two federal district court cases that addressed due
process rights for intellectually impaired K-12 students in
1972 were the equivalent of the Brown decision for disabled
students. Pennsylvania Association for Retarded Citizens
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(PARC) v. Pennsylvania was a class action suit on behalf of
all retarded students ages 6-21 in Pennsylvania who were
being denied access to public education by four state
statutes. The plaintiff class sought to overturn the
statutes as unconstitutional. Despite its class action
nature, litigators were fastidious in recognizing the
personal, individual rights of the seven individuals
involved. Exclusions were justified only if a school
psychologist certified a child was uneducable or
untrainable. However, the Commonwealth could not foresee
many instances, since education for self-improvement could
be defined by many criteria other than academics (PARC v.
Penn, 1972).
Osbourne Jr. (1996, p. 8) noted, “The dispute was
settled by a stipulation and consent agreement between the
parties and the court”. The three-judge panel ruled that
“Having undertaken to provide a free public education
to all of its children, including its exceptional
children, the Commonwealth of Pennsylvania may not
deny any mentally retarded child access to a free
public program of education and training” (PARC v.
Penn. (1972), p. 3).
Although the case was argued as a class action suit,
legal representation stressed that each child should be
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educated based on his or her individual need to acquire the
greatest amount of independence, and that individual
education plans (IEP) be created for each student. Thus it
can be argued that the legal principal of free appropriate
public education for each individual student (FAPE) was
established Daugherty, 2001; Turnbull III, 1986; Ballard et
al., 1982).
This case was also important because it declared that
all children were teachable and could learn, and that
learning need not pertain specifically to academics but
also included developmental skills like self-help,
communication, and functional academics. Functional
academics were defined as achieving reading and
mathematical ability at a fourth grade level. As a result,
parents obtained due process rights since school officials
were restricted from placing students with intellectual
impairments in exclusionary special education programs
without permission.
The second major due process case occurred in the
District of Columbia (Mills v. D. C. (1972). This case
extended free appropriate public education to students of
other disability groups: hyperactive, emotionally
disturbed, epileptic, orthopedically impaired, and learning
disabled. As Abeson (1973) noted, these students had been
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excluded from D. C. schools, approximately 18,000 out of
22,000. It was shown that the District knew these students
resided in the school census tract, but had failed to bring
them into school. The District was ordered to “go find”
these students. According to Trumbull III, (1986) finding
these students was the creation of the special education
principle of excluding no student, designated by the
district court as the principle of “zero reject”.
A major significance of the Mills case was the court’s
refusal to accept a lack of funding as an excuse to exclude
disabled students. As a result, the school district was
ordered to provide due process safeguards before any
student could be excluded (Abeson. 1973; Mills v. D. C.).
Osbourne Jr. (1996) argued that these safeguards later
formed the foundation for due process that was mandated in
the federal education statute.
While school districts might bristle and complain
about the high cost of providing for large numbers of
disabled students with various individual needs, Turnbull
III, (1986) Mills v. D C. (1972), and Sipuel (1948)
maintained that cost had never been accepted as an excuse
to exclude disabled students by federal courts during
litigation. While blacks had faced hostile whites whose
simplistic denial of civil rights were because of
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prejudice, the disabled faced a more sophisticated denial:
thrifty school boards who presented economic constraints as
justification to deny inclusion.
Litigation and Beginning Congressional Activity
During 1971 and 1972 the number of cases litigated for
inclusion and the right to an education proliferated in
federal district courts. Alan Abeson, Director, State
Federal Information Clearinghouse for Exceptional Children,
presented findings to the Subcommittee on the Handicapped
within the Senate Committee on Labor and Public Welfare
during committee hearings on March 20, 1973. During his
presentation he submitted a paper entitled: A Continuing
Summary of Pending and Completed Litigation Regarding the
Education of Handicapped Children. The paper highlighted 21
cases involving the right to an education, six cases
demanded the right to adequate treatment, and among them
were six cases that requested appropriate placement for
disabled students. All twenty-one of these cases cited by
Abeson identified lack of due process rights as their main
concern (U.S. Senate, Committee on Labor and Public
Welfare, Subcommittee on the Handicapped, 1973, pp. 39153).
According to Abeson, the explosion in the numbers of
due process cases by the time of the Senate Labor Committee
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Hearings in March 1973 could be attributed to society’s
gradually changing perception of disabled people as
individuals who needed job skills, and disabled individuals
who desired independence and the opportunity to develop
their own skills. Disabled people like Roberts and Heumann
came forward outside of formal Congressional hearings, and
indicated they desired independence and a level playing
field in order to compete and be included in society, not
sheltered, and protected from it.
A second reason mentioned by several scholars for
increased litigation was the proliferation of parent groups
who were able to lobby for their disabled children
(Switzer, 2003; Fleischer & Zames, 2002; Scotch, 2001;
Percy, 1989; Broudy, 1983). As Covey (1998) detailed, these
parents flooded district courts in 1971-72 with class
action suits using arguments similar to those employed by
BCRM attorneys from 1948-50, namely, that equal protection
rights of the individual were paramount to any restrictive
state statute. Since the federal government provided
funding to the states for special education programming,
these court cases emphasized due process under the Fifth
Amendment, equivalent to states’ insurance of equal
protection, under the Fourteenth Amendment.
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The Rehabilitation Act of 1973 – Section 504 Due Process
While increased litigation in the 1970’s for due
process may have accentuated media attention for the DRM
movement, Scotch (2001) and Percy (1989) argued that
Congress was already greatly influenced by the Disability
Rights movement by spring 1973 to enact legislation to
increase societal inclusion and improve economic
underperformance of disabled people. According to Bryan,
(2001, p. 33) “In the early 1970’s, rehabilitation leaders
backed by disability rights groups began to push for
changes in the legislation to advocate a broader nonvocational role for rehabilitation programs”. Disability
rights organizations, which had gained considerable
experience in politics, coalition building, lobbying, and
compromising had challenged lawmakers to act. They had
effectively developed a friendly base of Congressmen like
John Brandeis and Senators Alan Cranston, Randolph
Jennings, and William Stafford. Some Congressmen themselves
with disabled family relatives related to the DRM. Among
these friends were Senators Hubert Humphrey and Charles
Vanik. Humphrey had been active with organizations lobbying
for the intellectually impaired and Vanik had a
granddaughter with mental retardation.
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Previously, on January 20, 1972 Senator Humphrey had

introduced a bill that attempted to amend the Civil Rights
Act of 1964 in order to prohibit discrimination on the
basis of physical or mental handicap in federally assisted
programs. Humphrey proclaimed: “The time has come when we
can no longer tolerate the invisibility of the handicapped
in America…I am insisting that the civil rights of 40
million Americans now be affirmed… (Scotch, 2001, p. 43).
While the bill languished and finally died in
committee, its sentiments reappeared in March 1973 when the
Senate Committee on Labor and Public Welfare conducted
hearings to consider reauthorization of the vocational
rehabilitation program within the Rehabilitation Act of
1972 (P.L. 93-112). In conjunction with the House Committee
on Education and Labor, the committees scheduled hearings
with intent to pass a bill that expanded and improved the
vocational rehabilitation program.
According to testimony by advocates of the disabled
like South Carolina state Senator James Waddell, Jean
Garvin, Director of Special Education for Vermont, William
Geer, Executive Director of the Council for Exceptional
Children, and John Nagle, Chief of the Washington office of
the National Federation of the Blind, to name a few, (U.S.
Senate, Committee on Labor and Public Welfare, Subcommittee
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on the Handicapped, 1973) proponents emphasized preparation
for work and independent living over vocational training,
and creation of a general rehabilitation program for more
severely disabled people unable to work. During testimony
before the subcommittee, proponents on increasing funding
for the Rehabilitation Act stressed economic advantages.
John F. Nagle, Chairman of the Washington office of the
National Federation of the Blind, remarked,
“The real question, the only question, is whether
large sums of money should be used to educate
handicapped children toward useful, productive and
taxpaying lives as handicapped adults, or whether far
larger sums of money should be expended for the
maintenance and support of the handicapped for all of
their lives” (Subcommittee on the Handicapped, 1973
p.243).
Actor Lloyd Nolan, the father of an autistic son, noted,
“It seems we have a clearcut case. We can educate the
children at a cost of as much as $50,000; or we can let
them rot, and that will cost us about a quarter of a
million” (Subcommittee on the Handicapped, 1973 p. 200).
Referring toward increasing self-sufficiency for the
disabled, James Gallagher, Director of the Frank Graham
Porter Clinic for Child Development at the University of
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north Carolina, offered, “What we also know is that this is
not just a humanitarian thing to do, but this is an
economical and practical thing to do” (Subcommittee on the
Handicapped, 1973 p. 350).
Interestingly, those opposed to the bill were not
conservative legislators. “Rather, the opposition
apparently came from those who were committed to protecting
the groups already covered by Title VI of the Civil Rights
Act, notably blacks” (Scotch, 2001). Francis and Silvers
(2000) noted that during an interview session between civil
rights leader Stokeley Carmichael and Ed Roberts of the
Council for Independent Living, Carmichael had denied their
causes were the same. Francis and Silvers (2000, p. xvii)
indicated in regard to the disabled, that for years prior
to passage of the Civil Right Act of 1964, “few provisions
to relieve people with disabilities of their exclusion from
the opportunities available to everybody else were
integrated into comprehensive legislation aimed at
safeguarding them along with other minorities”.
Within this context of time, Congress was also
challenging the Executive in the area of civil rights
(Scotch, 2001). Nick Edes, for example, a legislative aide
to Senator Harrison Williams, described 1972 as a
confrontational time between the executive and legislative
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branches as to who would administer social policy, with a
President who was impounding appropriated Congressional
funds. According to Scotch, (2001, p. 48) Edes contended,
“It was a time for sweeping gestures, attempts to help
people, with social and economic costs considered not as
important as potential benefits and the political
opportunities that might be gained”.
During Subcommittee hearings in March 1973, several
proponents for reauthorizing the Rehabilitation Act
promoted civil rights for the disabled. Minority chairman
Senator Stafford remarked, “It is a legal right and it has
been established now in many court cases that handicapped
youngsters have a right in this country to an equal
education” (U.S. Senate, Committee on Labor and Public
Welfare, Subcommittee on the Handicapped, 1973, p. 211). At
the same Subcommittee hearing when referring to DRM
litigation, Dr. Gallagher stated, “These legal suits make
the case that the State has an obligation to provide
appropriate educational services for all handicapped
children” (p.349). Ultimately, Turnbull III (1986) and
Shrybman (1982) denoted that the focus of the
rehabilitation program in the reauthorization bill shifted
from vocational to civil rights and anti-discrimination
against disabled people because four amendments were added
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that guaranteed due process. They were known as Sections
501, 502, 503, and-504. As Percy (1989, p. 64) noted, “With
the passage of the Rehabilitation Act of 1973, Section 504
became law, following in the footsteps of other civil
rights laws”.
Scotch (2001) informed us that Congressman John
Brandemas, chairman of the House Committee on Education and
Labor, did the majority of the footwork on the House floor,
but Senators Alan Cranston and Harrison Williams took on
the mantle of civil rights over vocational rights for the
disabled in the Senate Committee. As Scotch (2001) and
Percy (1989) detailed in the legislative history of the
bill, the bill was “marked up” and sent to committee
staffers to be compromised. Senate Staff members included
Michael Burns, Jonathan Steinberg, Nik Edes, Lisa Walker,
Patria Forsythe, and Robert Humphreys on the Democratic
side and Michael Francis and Roy Millenson on the
Republican side of the aisle. House Staffers trying to
arrange a compromise bill included Jack Duncan for the
Democrats and Martin Lavor for Republicans.
As it was initially drafted, the Rehabilitation Act of
1973 did not include Section 504, which according to
Shrybman (1982, p. 29) “is the basic civil rights provision
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for ending discrimination against America’s handicapped
citizens”. Section 504 states,
“No otherwise qualified handicapped individual in the
United States… shall, solely by reason of his handicap,
be excluded from the participation in, be denied the
benefits of, or be subjected to discrimination under
any program or activity receiving federal financial
assistance” (Rehabilitation Act of 1973, p. 41;
Shrybman, p. 29).
The insertion of Section 504 originated in August
1973, when staffers were completing language on the bill.
(Scotch, 2001) indicated a fear existed that once disabled
individuals had received training, employers might
discriminate against them and refuse to hire them. They
wished to insert a civil rights provision similar to Title
VI of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 and Title IX of the
Education Amendments of 1972, but these staffers were not
experienced in the area of civil rights. However, Scotch
(2001) reported that they had previously done work in civil
rights on Title VI of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 and
Title VII that dealt with employment and affirmative
action. Thus it was evident that their linkage to the civil
rights movement in the past benefited the disabled with
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respect to getting an Act passed with a strongly affirmed
civil rights amendment.
The most important provision was Section 504. Here
was the equivalent of Title VI in the Civil Rights Act of
1964 that had guaranteed blacks their equal protection
rights. Ironically, when the bill came to the floor for
debate, Section 504 was not mentioned nor debated.
Lawmakers failed to realize the longstanding impact Section
504 would play in the future for civil rights for the
disabled. National media attention was muted compared to
passage of the Civil Rights Act of 1964.
President Nixon signed the bill into law on September
29, 1973. According to Scotch (2001) and Schrybman (1982)
the President paid little to no attention to the Section
504 anti-discrimination provision that would cost millions
to the federal government in later years. Staffers had
added the provision as an afterthought. Scotch (2001, p.
49) summed up passage of the Rehabilitation Act of 1973 by
remarking, “As it was initially drafted, the legislation
did not include Section 504. Nor was Section 504 suggested
at any of the hearings held on the proposed law”. Rather,
Roy Millenson of Senator Javits staff had been involved in
the development of the Education Amendments. He was able to
integrate a civil rights statement with language from Title
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VI and insert it at the end of the bill. Hence it received
the name Section 504. Covey (2002, p. 173) argued that the
Rehabilitation Act of 1973 meant “a new view of what
rehabilitation was” and “persons with disabilities being
identified as a “minority class” of citizens of a distinct
nature, not simply aggregated with other minority
categories”.
As it evolved, Section 504 became a strong civil rights
plank for the disabled in the Rehabilitation Act Amendments
of 1973, (P.L. 93-112) according to Daugherty, (2001)
Osbourne Jr., (1996) and Turnbull III (1986) because
bureaucrats within the Office of the Handicapped within the
Education Department sought to implement it whenever
provision of the Rehabilitation Act needed interpretation.
This Office for the Handicapped (OCR) within the Education
Department had been created with passage of the
Rehabilitation Act, and its officers became strong
supporters on disability civil rights after 1973, often
challenging federal interpretation of rehabilitation rules
and regulations. Thus a precedent was established intoned
by several scholars (Switzer, 2003; Fleischer & Zames,
2001; Shrybman, 1982) where with each interpretive ruling,
disabled individuals gained greater due process.

	
  

	
  

89	
  

Genesis of the Education for All Handicapped Act
The Rehabilitation Act of 1973 guaranteed due process
rights to disabled adults involved in federally funded
activities. There was as yet, of course, no legislation
protecting children, only rights won through litigation in
federal courts in the judicial branch of the government.
This was to change as documented by Ballard et al., (1982)
the National Education Association, (1978) and Abeson et
al. (1975) in their histories of the genesis of the
Education for All Handicapped Children Act (P.L. 94-142).
This change occurred once public awareness had been
created, the Rehabilitation Act of 1973 had passed, and the
government accepted the disabled as a distinct minority.
Switzer’s (2003, p. 75) historical analysis that “disabled
people do not speak with one voice” had been altered.
Legislation for a FAPE is Enacted
Given the highly charged atmosphere of litigation, the
conclusion of House and Senate hearings that emphasized
greater productivity for the disabled, and passage of the
Rehabilitation Act of 1973 affirming civil rights for the
disabled, the 94th Congress met in session to extend funding
for the states for special education with Public Law 93380. Turnbull III (1986, p. 14) noted that Congress
realized “its 1974 law was an interim measure only and
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would have to be supplanted”. Parent lobbying groups,
increased media attention of alternative treatment and
educational programs for the disabled, and demonstrations
and testimonials from disabled people themselves who pushed
for greater independence and the right to pursue more
fulfilling economic and social roles were also pressuring
Congress.
Senator Harrison with 29 co-sponsors introduced the
EHA, on January 15, 1975 as Senate Bill Six (Library of
Congress, 1/14/11). Cremins (1983) argued that it became
the landmark legislation statute passed by Congress during
the decade of the seventies. It passed the Senate on June
18, 1975 and the House on July 29, 1975. President Ford
signed it into law as P. L. 94-142 on November 29, 1975.
According to Turnbull III, (1986) Cremins, (1983)
and NEA, (1978) the law mandated a free appropriate public
education for all children aged three to twenty-one.

A

multidisciplinary team must evaluate each child, the
results of which were to yield an individualized education
plan (IEP). The plan must specify the child’s present level
of performance, annual short and long-term goals for
instruction, services to be provided, and a schedule of
implementation in the least restrictive environment, and
criteria for evaluating pupil progress. Parents obtained
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due process rights to challenge assessment, identification,
and placement for their children.
States were ordered to develop a plan for education of
special education students and have the plan approved by
the Office of Civil Rights (OCR) within the Department of
Education by September 1977. The plan must address six
principles of due process: 1) zero reject, 2) testing,
classification and placement, 3) individualized and
appropriate education, 4) least restrictive environment, 5)
procedural due process, and 6) Parent participation and
shared decision making (Turnbull III, 1986; NEA, 1978;
Abeson et. al., 1975). This legislation protecting due
process rights for children under the federal Fifth
Amendment was equivalent to states’ equal protection rights
protected by the Fourteenth Amendment under the Civil
Rights Act of 1964.
Since 1977 all fifty states have submitted special
education plans to the Office of Special Education and
Rehabilitative Services (OSERS) within the Department of
Education in Washington, D.C. States have received annual
funding from Congress, albeit never at the forty percent
proposed funding level originally designed. Turnbull III
(1986) has verified that cost has continually been a
nagging factor affecting the establishment and maintenance
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of special education programs in every school district in
the United States, with many states siphoning funds from
their regular education budgets to satisfy the due process
mandates of special education required by the EHA.
Conclusion
In summary, the Disability Rights Movement owes its
success at achieving due process to the BCRM and the Legal
Defense Team who waged an aggressive campaign from 1948-50
that convinced the Supreme Court in several cases that
denial of higher education in a white environment was an
infringement of equal protection under the Fourteenth
Amendment to black students in an individualized and
personal manner. Recognition of this infringement by the
Court on a class basis reached a culmination with the Brown
case in 1954. Accordingly, a small number of leaders with
disabilities were influenced by the achievements of the
BCRM, and within the context of competing minority group
movements of the times, advocated for their personal
rights, their right to compete on a level playing field
within normal society, where their disability was accepted
as part of who they were, as opposed to something they must
overcome to obtain inclusion.
DRM leaders like Ed Roberts and Judy Heumann educated
themselves to enter the governmental power structure, and
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some influential federal Congressmen recognized the
importance of securing increased economic performance from
the disabled. Legislation was crafted from 1973-75 that
guaranteed civil rights to the disabled and recognition as
a distinct minority. The Education for All Handicapped
Children Act (P.L. 94-142) promised a free appropriate
public education (FAPE) for students aged three to twentyone in the least restrictive environment (LRE).
According to Clarizio, (1983) the shift of societal
perception of disabilities toward more productivity changed
expectations from one of paternalism to more independence.
With this independence, disabled individuals required more
accommodations to become inclusive and adapt to what Smart
(2001, pp. 36-38) called an environmental model of
inclusion. A changing perception of disabled people fueled
a change in methodological outlook from a medical model of
entitlements, training, and subservience by mainstream
society to a more psycoeducational outlook that stressed
civil rights, more independent living, rehabilitation, and
contribution to normal society when individuals with
disabilities were provided with accommodations. This
changing outlook meant education was key toward treatment
and development of independent living skills.
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A Recognition of due process rights meant that society

could never return to the exclusionary practices of
education, housing, and employment of the past. It is clear
that the combination of advocacy, organizational talent,
federal litigation, and conspiring events within other
minority movements such as the Black Civil Rights Movement
helped propel a small cadre of talented college educated
disabled people to positions within the power structure
where they could lobby for additional meaningful
legislation to produce legal due process and special
education for the disabled.
Scholars and textbook authors who have written how
Brown was the catalyst for the DRM have failed to recognize
the importance of the accomplishments of the BCRM from
1948-50 prior to Brown. Acknowledging these accomplishments
means scholars may depict an alternative knowledge base of
due process/equal protection from the simplistic class
based depiction of the past. It remains to analyze and
interpret this reconstructed knowledge to see how scholars
can benefit from this new awakening. I will address this
issue in chapter three.
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CHAPTER THREE
ANALYSIS AND INTERPRETATION

Methodology
I have attempted to assemble primary and secondary
sources that addressed the relationship of the BCRM prior
to Brown to the DRM and its subsequent efforts to acquire
due process legislation for the disabled, and what scholars
can glean from that. I have attempted to review judicial
and Congressional data, personal testimony, influential
personalities of the era, and respected scholarly writing
to expose that previous scholars have asked incorrect
questions when comparing the BCRM and DRM movements and
arrived at conclusions too simplistic and not very
insightful.
Critics may suspect my interpretation and analysis
because I was limited by sample size, as many disabled
people in the 1950’s and 1960’s remained out of public
view. A question arose whether leaders of the DRM like Ed
Roberts and Judy Heumann accurately represented the mood of
the disabled population. Nevertheless, as I examined
history, Eichelberger (1989, p. 246) shared that when
selecting data “the selection process determines the
likelihood that the sample of subjects who actually
participated in the study was representative of the
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accessible population and that the target population was of
concern to the researcher or reader”. As an historian
making an analysis of people and events, causality need not
inhibit analysis and interpretation because causality can
never be established. “The best that can be done is to
establish a plausible connection between the presumed cause
and effect” (Anderson, 1990, p. 118). In the final analysis
I valued the judgment of C. H. Edson who said there was no
single, definable method of historical inquiry.
I have examined holdings from Supreme Court Cases and
state courts prior to Brown that addressed equal protection
rights for blacks from 1948-1950 in an attempt to discern
judicial reasoning that resulted in the protection of those
rights. Key to this investigation was the primary sources
of the legal team of participants representing the
plaintiffs, referred to as the Legal Defense Team of the
NAACP. Secondary authors who are literary experts on the
civil rights era (1954-1968) like Charles Carson, Taylor
Branch, Charles Payne, Richard Kluger, and Juan Williams
furnished a narrative commentary of actions and events that
occurred during that time period. The video series “Eyes on
the Prize” on the civil rights era by Blackside, Inc. was a
valuable source of primary graphic imagery of the Civil
Rights Era.
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Disabled individuals like Ed Roberts and Judy Heumann

provided personal testimonials of how it is to be disabled,
and how they developed into effective lobbyists. Their
education and political activity allowed them access to the
established governmental decision-making power structure.
Authors Willie Bryan and James Charlton provided insight of
how disabled people have been treated in the past and how
they seek acceptance and desire independence in their
societal treatment. Supreme Court and state court cases
involving due process rights for the disabled from 1967-72
formed a core of primary sources that demonstrated the
progression of due process prior to passage of the
Rehabilitation Act of 1973.
Another set of primary sources consisted of
influential members of Congress and their Congressional
aides who helped to design legislation for due process for
the disabled and created the language of special education
law. The pages of testimony presented to the Senate
Subcommittee on the Handicapped, part of the Senate
Committee on Labor and Public Welfare, and the over 500
pages of testimony presented by the House Committee on
Education and Labor provided valuable primary sources of
those who partook in eventually creating and passing
legislation for the disabled.

	
  

Both famous and common
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people presented testimony to both Senate and House
subcommittees extolling the value of educational programs
for the disabled that enhanced independence, practical
living skills, and a more productive economic future.
Secondary sources included scholars like Doris
Fleischer, Frieda Zames, Jacqueline Switzer, Stephen Percy,
and Laura Rothstein and scholars who were also disabled
like James Charlton and Willie Bryan who enumerated and
offered analyses of disabilities and disability litigation
and legislation. The work of Richard Scotch, pre-eminent
scholar in documenting the rights of the disabled was an
invaluable secondary source, especially in documenting
passage of the Vocational and Rehabilitation Act of 1973.
Connecting BCRM / DRM Litigation
In analyzing litigation the BCRM undertook prior to
the 1954 Brown decision, principally the Gaines, Sipuel,
McLaurin, and Sweatt cases, the Supreme Court ruled that a
state could not deny privilege under equal protection to a
group based solely on race. In the Gaines v. Missouri
(1938) decision Chief Justice Hughes declared that denying
state privileges based upon race was “a denial of the
equality of legal right to the enjoyment of the privilege”
(p. 4). In succeeding cases, the Court consistently held
that the issue of race could not be a factor determining
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privilege. “The state must provide legal education for
petitioner in conformity with the equal protection clause
of the Fourteenth Amendment…” (Sweatt v. Painter, 1950, p.
3). While it is undeniable that scholars (Irons, 2002;
Gray, 2002; Tushnet, 1987) agreed that in these early cases
race and minority group status was one of the benchmarks
for which the Court determined the disenfranchisement of
equal protection, it was not the only factor.
What scholars have failed to scrutinize in these early
cases is that the Court set the precedent for recognizing
the individuality of the petitioner in his/her denial of
rights not his/her denial based solely upon minority and
racial status. Chief Justice Hughes had stated in the
Gaines decision, (1938) “It is the individual who is
entitled to the equal protection of the laws…” (p. 4). This
precedent continued through the Sipuel, (1948) McLaurin,
(1950) and Sweatt (1950) cases. Chief Justice Vinson
declared in Sweat v. Painter, (1950, p. 3) “It is
fundamental that these cases concern rights which are
personal and present”. The word “fundamental” was key, for
it indicated the Court no longer conceived of equal
protection privilege solely along racial and minority
status, but also because of the intrinsic personal nature
and value of the individual.
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Importance in acceptance of individuality was a

primary connection with subsequent due process cases for
the disabled. This individuality was key to accepting the
petitioner not as a group but as an independent person, a
distinct personality with an individualized disability.
While scholars like Rothstein, (2000) Osbourne Jr.,
(1996) and Turnbull III, (1986) may wish to emphasize how
national attention and increased parent advocacy
intensified to designate the disabled as a recognized
minority group during the 1960’s and early 1970’s,
litigation during this time centered specifically on
recognizing the rights of the individual through class
action suits. Attorneys in the Wolf, Diana, Wyatt, PARC,
and Mills, cases, which were highlighted in chapter two,
argued that these disabled petitioners were individuals
with personal specific disabilities. Their value as
individuals required inclusion in the mainstream and
accommodations within an Individual Education Plan (IEP) to
succeed independently to their greatest capability.
Scholars like Covey (1998) have argued how advocates
of the disabled emulated the BCRM by using similar legal
arguments of minority status. However, he has missed the
notion of the importance of individuality in these initial
DRM court cases, made possible by BCRM cases argued by the
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Legal Defense Team previous to Brown. This is a critical
omission because his reasoning assumed early DRM success at
litigation was based on recognition of minority status,
class-consciousness, and a common goal. In fact, courts
never suggested minority recognition in these judicial
cases. Due process rights of personal, individual children
were paramount in these case holdings. These decisions
ultimately paved the way for the creation of special
education on an individualized basis rather than on a class
basis.
This misunderstanding can alter the impression of the
theoretical philosophy and structural framework scholars
and specialists who teach K-12 education may possess. These
providers might lose sight of the personality and
individual needs of the individual and mistakenly classify
and categorize disabled students by disability type rather
than by individual need. A grouping mentality is anathema
to the theoretical way of thinking in special education.
Scholars like Hardeman et al. (2008) maintained the
DRM was influenced by the BCRM during the Civil Rights Era
1954-68. It is accurate DRM advocates emulated and copied
some tactics employed by blacks for many of their local
housing, transportation, and work accommodation concerns:
marches, demonstrations, sit-ins, and boycotts. Some
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scholars like Kirk et al. (2000) and Gearheart et al.
(1996) assumed this emulation also helped to increase
class-consciousness of the disabled and their evolution
into a mass movement during this time period. However as
Fleischer and Zames, (2001) Scotch, (2001) and Percy (1989)
demonstrated in key literature, the DRM was a fractured,
disunited group with questionable minority status during
the Civil Rights Era. It required a generation (1948-73)
before the DRM accepted itself as a unified movement,
achieved minority status from Congress, and was thus able
to achieve due process legislation with passage of the
Rehabilitation Act of 1973 (NEA, 1978; Abeson et al.,
1975).

It is important that scholars denote this slowly

evolving class-consciousness so they do not assume a
seamless transition of educational inclusion occurred
following Brown. However, it is not essential because
minority status was not the benchmark determined by
Congress when it established due process legislation for
the disabled. Instead Congress considered individuality as
evidenced by linking federal funding to anti-discrimination
(Rehabilitation Act of 1973, 1973).
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Differences in Two Movements
What scholars need to note is that the civil rights
litigation by the BCRM prior to Brown was the crucial time
period in the relationship between the BCRM and the DRM,
not the period following Brown. Prominent civil rights
writers like Taylor Branch, Juan Williams, and “Eyes on the
Prize” archival video footage have exaggerated scholarly
emphasis of actions and events between 1954-68 in its
influence in promoting civil rights for all minorities.
What is more accurate when scholars investigate the
leadership, membership, and organization of the two
movements during the Civil Rights Era, is more their
differences rather than their similarities. It is these
differences that help one understand how the movements
worked more distinct from each other than in concert
together. Other than Thurgood Marshall, named a Supreme
Court justice in 1967, Hubert Humphrey, a hero for black
civil rights at the 1948 Democratic Convention, and Judge
Frank Johnson, appellate judge for the Wyatt v. Hardin case
and the judge who allowed James Meredith to enroll into Ole
Miss in 1962, blacks or their supporters, according Francis
and Silvers, (2000) were mostly tepid bystanders during the
Civil Rights Era (Francis and Silver, 2000).
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There may have been two reasons for this lack of

support. First, limited resources in affording litigation.
Second, lack of identification with class-consciousness
with disabled individuals who differed in color, education,
geographic location, and socio-economic status.
An indicator of the importance of the relationship
between the BCRM and the DRM prior to Brown rather than
after Brown is to analyze leadership, membership, and
organization of both movements. A review of major
literature revealed stark differences in these categories
between the movements. Leadership within the BCRM of
talented lawyers, literate preachers trained at highly
respected divinity schools, and national organizers trained
by a top-down organization (NAACP) contrasted sharply with
leadership characteristics of the DRM who were white, upper
middle-class, college educated, urban, and by the 1970’s,
connected to the existing white power structure (Scotch,
2001).
Juan Williams, (2004) Richard Kluger, (2004) Charles
Payne, (1995) Taylor Branch, (1998) and Charles Carson
(1981) highlighted how membership of the BCRM consisted of
the entire black community whether urban or rural, rich or
poor, educated or illiterate united together to fight a
legally enforced Jim Crow power structure that ostracized
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and excluded them from social and economic acceptance.
Whereas disabled individuals, many would not even refer to
themselves as a “membership”, (Scotch, 2001) lacked a
unified collective consciousness because of their disparate
disabilities. They mainly lived with family, separated from
other disabled individuals, and ignorant of the size of
their numbers.
Their success at achieving due process rights
according to Scotch, (2001) Bryan, (1996) and Turnbull III
(1986) lay with lobbying top-down power brokers,
Congressmen, Congressional aides familiar with the black
civil rights legislation language, and from testimonials
from notable and famous personalities who had stories to
tell of disabled loved ones (U.S. Senate, Committee on
Labor and Public Welfare, Subcommittee on the Handicapped,
1973; U.S. House of Representatives, Committee on Education
and Labor, Subcommittee on Select Education, Hearings on
Education of the Handicapped Amendments, 1973).
According to Carson, (1981) the BCRM utilized a
bottom-up strategy of organization that took advantage of
trained organizers in organizations like the Southern
Christian Leadership Conference, Student Nonviolent
Coordinating Committee, (SNCC) Congress of Racial Equality,
(CORE) and the NAACP who energized a mainly rural and

	
  

	
  

106	
  

poorly educated base. They emphasized that blacks could no
longer accept the status quo power structure, humiliating
and demeaning as it existed. The organization courted both
national and local media to get this message across,
represented most visually during the 1968 strike by garbage
workers in Memphis, Tennessee, when workers paraded down
Memphis streets wearing sandwich boards that read: I AM A
MAN! (Williams, 1987; Eyes on the Prize, 1986).
This contrasted with any concerted organizational
strategy by the DRM during the Civil Rights Era. Key was
historical research (Scotch, 1989, pp. 380-400) that showed
the DRM was a loosely structured grassroots organization
with few resources and achieved coordination on occasional
events that brought activists forth. According to Scotch,
(1989 p.389) the DRM “ did not control an institutional
network”. There was no aggregate data on individual or
organizational participation in the DRM. Instead their
interests were advanced during the 1960’s and early 1970’s
by top-down advocacy from parent lobbying groups and nondisabled beneficent leaders of charitable and governmental
organizations.
The few individual leaders with disabilities like Ed
Roberts and Judy Heumann who spoke for the disabled did not
do so in a coordinated organizational fashion, but did so
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randomly, to address personal local concerns of housing,
transportation, and working conditions. Had those
commanding the power and authorization adequately addressed
these localized issues, one may doubt whether serious
advocacy action may have occurred, or whether there would
have been notable media attention.
Therefore, rather than scholars emphasizing the
coalescence of two movements during the Civil Rights Era
and the so-called seamless nature of inclusion by blacks
and the disabled, they need to stress the irony that the
two movements moved in the same direction toward civil
rights at all. As previously stated, a review of major
court cases following the Brown decision revealed little to
no interchange of expertise from leadership of the BCRM to
advocates of the disabled. Members of the Legal Defense
Team, with the exception of Thurgood Marshall, were
noticeably absent, as were major BCRM organizational
leaders.
Thus scholars have examined inaccurate events and the
wrong time period when exploring the relationship of the
black and disabled movements. They have incorrectly
surmised that one movement (BCRM) seamlessly ushered in due
process rights for the other movement (DRM). They have
explored the wrong question: How did one movement assist
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the other during the Civil rights Era? The important
question is how did the DRM value its relationship to the
BCRM during the time period before Brown?
Individuality As Linkage of Two Movements
The answer may be that the Legal Defense Team
litigated a number of equal protection cases that
established precedence that first, individuals could not be
denied equal protection privileges based solely on race.
Second, what would prove most important as a legal
justification for future advocates representing due process
litigation (1967-72) for the DRM, Supreme Court justices
became convinced that equal protection was personal and
specific to an individual petitioner and not a legalistic
abstract tenet only of race, minority status, or classconsciousness.
The idea of individuality gave a human face to what is
meant by equal protection and due process. This was
accomplished through the holdings in these crucial cases
that preceded the Brown decision. Holdings in Gaines,
Sipuel, McLaurin, and Sweatt emphasized the value of the
individual and acceptance of individual differences. It
gave a human face to a legal argument. Litigators in future
DRM cases would assert the value of the individual,
acceptance of individual differences, the petitioners
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personal disability, and the realistic accommodations that
were necessary to protect individuality and personal
independence. This idea supersedes the more restrictive
thinking generated in Brown that denying inclusive
education on a K-12 level was based upon a collective
racial or class-conscious paradigm.
Independence
Whereas the concept of group and collective classconsciousness may be associated with classification and
categorization such as race, gender, religion, or national
origin, the idea of individuality is rooted in the notion
of uniqueness, independence, and personal characteristics.
While the Brown decision legalized public education for a
particular class of people, namely non-whites, prior Brown
cases addressed a personal individual. It was this
individuality that led litigants of the disabled to
emphasize how education could create acceptance of their
character, require society to provide accommodations, and
therefore increase their independence to achieve practical
living skills to the best of their functioning ability.
Charlton (1998, p. 23-24)) noted that without economic
independence, the disabled were characterized as “outcasts”
and “surplus population”. Rather than being lumped into a
class-conscious group, litigation for due process for the
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disabled in the early 1970’s stressed the inherent respect
and value of the individual, (Wolf, 1969; PARC, 1972;
Mills, 1972) what Nagle referred to as the petitioner’s
basic civil rights. Bryan (2002, p. 173) stressed the preeminence of the individual over being labeled as a minority
class when he stated, “Instead, those with disabilities
were defined as unique with their disabilities overriding
any other minority status as a class title…” As a result,
Civil rights obtained, according to Bryan (2002), required
accommodation from mainstream society.
Scholars have neglected to emphasize the importance
independence meant for the disabled as they struggled to
obtain due process legislation from 1954-73, instead
focusing on minority status as Brown emphasized. This
created unnecessary delay as scholars argued back and forth
who was and who was not a minority group. Michael Hineberg,
Independent Living Coordinator for Independence First in
Milwaukee, Wisconsin, cautioned non-disabled people about
helping the disabled in his article Seven Statements People
With Disabilities Do Not Want To Hear to “use careful
judgment when you offer help, because independence is a
core issue to anyone with a disability” (Hineberg, 2010,
p.7). He also intoned that the term “those” people connotes
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separateness and what is different. “People with
disabilities want to be treated as equals” (p. 7).
Scholars need to cease emphasizing that attaining
minority group status during the Civil Rights Era was
important for disabled people. First, it never occurred
since they were not legitimately recognized as such until
1973. Second, they did not desire to be categorized into
being another minority group. They were already separated
from society.
Federal Legislation of Due Process Rights for the Disabled
It has been established by several scholars (Hetzner,
2011; Longmore, 2003; Bryan, 2002; Charlton, 1998) that in
order to achieve greater economic potential, societal
accommodations were needed that created opportunities for
employment, independence, and the development of practical
living skills. By the 1970’s, the disabled needed
legislation to guarantee their civil rights, and improved
accommodations so they could compete more fairly in normal
society. While Congressional House and Senate hearings in
1973-74 sought to extend the economic potential of the
disabled, Scotch (2001) maintained that advocacy soon
evolved toward basic civil rights. Thus Section 504 of the
Rehabilitation Act of 1973 reflected nearly intact language
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in the Civil Rights Act of 1964 that protected minorities
from discrimination.
The difference in constructing this civil rights
language for the disabled from language that was developed
for minorities in 1964 was that rights of an individual
were emphasized over civil rights of a race or class. This
individuality of the person’s right ultimately owes its
creation to Supreme Court cases reviewed in the literature
prior to Brown: Gaines, Sipuel, McLaurin, and Painter.
However, one would search diligently to find this
connection in scholarly writing, where importance easily
shifts to the connection with Brown. Had this connection to
Brown been accurate, one could question whether a twentyyear delay of due process for the disabled would have
occurred. It is more difficult to explain how, if this
connection were indeed true, there was not a concomitant
push for litigation and legislation for both movements
during the same time period.
Due process for disabled children also lagged years
behind the equal protection that had occurred for minority
children during the Civil Rights Era. However, once Section
504 guaranteed due process for disabled adults, efforts to
extend rights to school age children for inclusion in
public education became an extended outgrowth. Legislation

	
  

	
  

113	
  

eventually passed in 1975, The Education for All
Handicapped Children Act (EHA or P. L. 94-142). It
guaranteed a free appropriate public education (FAPE) in
the least restrictive environment (LRE) in a program that
met the individual needs of the child. Parents had the
right to challenge assessment and placement in a special
education program. The safeguards of Section 504 applied to
children as well.
Implications of Section 504 and P. L. 94-142
Analyzing the historical context of Section 504
revealed that neither its creators nor its enforcers
envisioned the millions of dollars in revenue that were
needed to enforce it within the executive department of the
federal government over the next thirty-five years. Section
504, according to Scotch (2001) and Shrybman, (1982) had
been added to the bill as an afterthought. The President,
distracted with his own impeachment proceedings in 1973,
had paid no attention to its ramifications, nor had he
anticipated what a powerful lever for due process it would
be for special education policy. At times, historical
trends and events may be the result of serendipity.
When comparing legislation that established due
process for the disabled to the court cases before Brown,
the linkage to individuality, personal rights, the
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intrinsic value of the person, and acceptance of the
individual’s distinct disability and needs established two
basic premises that have influenced creation and
implementation of special education over the past thirtyfive years. First, acceptance of one’s disability and the
right to have it and to compete in a more equal societal
setting has rendered the argument of philosophical approach
to treatment models between a medical model or an
educational model moot. Causation of disability is no
longer an issue. Debates in the 1940’s and 1950’s that
argued whether society or the disabled individual needed to
accommodate are no longer important.
Education, independence, and approximating the
individual to his highest level of independent living are
paramount. This involves societal accommodation and the
acceptance of civil rights for the individual. Scholars no
longer depict the disabled as one class or one minority,
but as a host of individuals, each with his or her
individual needs. The class-conscious sweeping holding in
Brown does not apply nor should it be the standard scholars
depict when comparing the BCRM to the DRM.
Second, independence is emphasized over economic
consideration. While economic factors like employment are
an integral part of one’s independence, they do not
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ultimately uphold the basic value itself of the individual
and societal acceptance of the existence of a person’s
disability and strength of character. Today organizations
like L. I. F. E. Academy (Leisure, Inclusion, Fun,
Experiences) in West Allis, Wisconsin plan for a smoother
transition from high school to independent living by
challenging the individual to work within the realm of his
disability

(Hetzner, 2011, pp. 1-2).

Acceptance of the basic rights of the individual over
the economic potential the person can generate to benefit
society is key. Education that increases practical
independent living supersedes any individualized vocational
training or dispensed paternalistic offerings that address
solely economic behavior. In a comparison, due process
rights supplant economic rights, and in treatment of the
disabled, the economy should be a non-factor.
In conclusion, I maintain that individuality and the
value of the person reflected the relationship between the
BCRM and the DRM in the holdings in several cases that
preceded the Brown decision, not race, class-consciousness,
or minority status. Scholars have overemphasized the
importance of Brown in this relationship, and they have
overly relied on the collective class-consciousness and
racial overtones of the case. They have incorrectly assumed
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a seamless transition of due process rights for blacks and
the disabled based on the holding in Brown. They have
chosen a time period of the Civil Rights Era (1948-68) to
explore the relationship between the BCRM and the DRM that
did not compare because this era addressed the rights of a
minority class as an aggregated group and missed the
evolution of rights for the disabled as one of
individuality, linked to the BCRM in a pre-Brown time
period.
Scholars need to revisit their interpretation of equal
protection and due process for these two movements and be
more accurate in noting similarities and differences. As
scholars reinterpret the relationship between the two
movements, they will develop an alternative understanding
of the structural framework and theoretical interpretation
of special education in K-12 education. Chapter four will
provide some conclusions about this alternative thinking.
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CHAPTER FOUR
CONCLUSION

Individualism Versus Minority Status
If scholars examine the relationship between the BCRM
and the DRE, the critical time period was 1948-50. It was
during that period the Legal Defense Team established the
importance of individuality and the present and personal
experience of equal protection of the litigant to the
Supreme Court. While race was a factor in the court
decisions of Gaines, Sipuel, Sweatt, and Painter, scholars
have overlooked the deeper insightful thinking of the
justices. They have overlooked the importance of
individuality because of the landmark Brown decision of
1954 outlawing denial of equal protection because of race
and minority status. Scholars seized the idea that
outlawing discrimination against blacks meant all
minorities would benefit from the judicial ruling.
This did not prove to be the case as key literature
demonstrated those with disabilities obtained few
opportunities for inclusion over several succeeding years.
Too much scholarly time was devoted toward trying to
establish minority status when that factor never mattered.
Advocacy groups for the disabled appealed to an alternative
strategy other than minority status to influence
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legislators and the courts. They resorted to emphasizing
the importance of the individuality of the person. This
importance enjoined society to accept the character of the
individual disabled person by accepting the person’s
distinct disability. Implicit in this acceptance was
society’s responsibility to provide reasonable
accommodations for the disabled individual to compete as
equally as possible in those aspects of society deemed most
necessary for the pursuit of happiness: education, housing,
mobility, employment, and leisure.
Even though litigation was pressed in the form of
class action suits to enjoin courts to hear the cases,
advocates stressed individuality over minority status as a
legal strategy, emphasizing personal goals over group
goals. Litigation for the disabled from 1967-72 centered
upon education. This education had to increase
independence, practical living skills, and preparation for
life in mainstream society. An individual education plan
was paramount, and the idea of categorization,
classification, class-consciousness, or group
identification did not apply.
Therefore, the Brown decision was not representative
of the relationship between the BCRM and the DRM. The
crucial relationship was the linkage with the prior Supreme
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Court cases Gaines, Sipuel, Sweatt, and Painter. These
cases provided the link of individuality that united the
two movements.
Recognizing Structural Framework of Special Education
If scholars recognize this linkage, and they
acknowledge that the DRM identified 1948-50 as the
important time period to emulate the tactics of the BCM,
then they will comprehend how legislation to create special
education developed. They will more clearly understand why
special education in K-12 public schools is based on six
principles elaborated by Turnbull III: (1986) 1) Individual
and appropriate education, 2) Least restrictive
environment, 3) Zero reject, 4) Testing, assessment and
placement, 5) Procedural due process, and 6) Parent
participation and shared decision making. Each of these
principles was designed to protect the due process of an
individual, not a group or class.
Scholars should realize that due process of the
disabled is inherently bound up with individual and
personal rights, not the rights of a group or a minority.
Thus all actions to increase academic, social, and
emotional performance of the student must be individually
based and never compared to a norm.

	
  

	
  

120	
  
Scholars who recognize the DRM copied the Legal

Defense Team’s posturing of individuality in cases prior to
Brown may view the structural framework of special
education in that vein. Structural framework refers to the
manner in which special education due process was
established and how it is implemented in today’s schools.
Individuality avoids educating students together as a group
or category type. Each student is assessed, programmed for
coursework, and evaluated based on his individual education
plan. Performance success is measured by what skill
development is needed to reach the next level of
performance. The student is never compared to the
performance of others.
Scholars in the past, when comparing the inclusion of
blacks as a minority and disabled students, have erred in
their perception of special education. Based on how they
compared it to the inclusion promised in Brown for
minorities, they have incorrectly classified special
education as a secondary arm of regular education devoted
to another type of minority. When in fact an analogy of
special education depicts it as a mosaic of individuals and
not a unified systemic complete picture. Each child in
special education possesses a unique, specialized,
individual education plan. Scholars have erred if they have
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categorized special education as a monolithic systematized
institution.
Independence and Accommodation
If one views the structural framework of special
education as a collection of individuals rather than as one
systematized wing of the broader education system, one
comprehends the essence of independence upon which it is
built. The goal of special education is independence of the
disabled individual. This involves increasing practical
living skills and functional independence. For this to
occur, the individual will need opportunities to compete in
society where he or she can develop the skills needed to be
independent. Scholars need to redevelop their perception of
disabilities away from paternalism toward independence,
because the burden then shifts responsibility for providing
accommodations upon society. Scholars who have devoted
research toward maintaining medical models of treatment for
the disabled are not contributing to their independence.
They may be promoting paternalistic dependence by failing
to recognize a need to balance society’s competition.
Key literature indicated that most disabled
individuals desire independence and want to achieve in an
inclusive society. If scholars recognized individuality
instead of categorizing the disabled as a group, they will
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better understand that the goal of K-12 special education
is to increase a disabled person’s ability to the greatest
level of their performance. That means their education will
be practical and relevant to their life needs. This will
insure dynamic programming that meets the individual needs
of the learner, rather than a rote set of courses.
Conclusion
Finally, examining the relationship between two
movements, the BCM and the DRE, has revealed that scholars
erred when they assumed the Brown decision ushered in a new
era of inclusion for the disabled. It did not occur because
the premise upon which it was based, minority status, was
faulty. Scholars wasted considerable research time arguing
about minority status when it was not a factor.
Individuality was the factor that eventually opened the
door of due process in legislation for the disabled. This
was made possible by tactics advocates of the disabled
emulated from legal arguments promoted by the Legal Defense
Team of the BCRM from 1948-50, when these attorneys
convinced Supreme Court justices in four crucial cases that
equal protection was a personal, individual matter with
repercussions to the individual when rights were denied. It
went beyond group or class-consciousness.
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Future research may have scholars stress the

importance of individuality to implementation of special
education when they author textbooks designed for an
audience that will teach disabled students. Students in the
field need to be cognizant of the individualistic nature of
special education for a student-by-student approach so they
do not categorize special education as an organizational
institution administering to yet another minority group.
Future studies will hopefully emphasize the humanness of
special education over the organizational role.
The Future of Special Education
Given the individuality of special education as it was
designed educational professional will need to explore
equal protection in the context of the regular education
classroom the special education student will attend. As
important as the individual needs are of the disabled
students, so are the equal protection rights of regular
students and the educational climate of the classroom. The
school must provide a learning environment free of
disruption and distraction. This may pose a challenge to
the regular teacher and support special education personnel
given the nature of intellectual, emotional, and learning
disabilities displayed by disabled students. Guaranteeing
due process rights of the disabled cannot be at the expense
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of regular education students whose civil rights must also
be protected.
Promoting a more inclusive setting that protects due
process rights for the disabled while ensuring a calm
learning environment for a majority of regular education
students will continue to pose a challenge for educators.
Special educators will need to coordinate their teaching
with regular education colleagues to insure that the needs
of all students are met. In addition, it will be important
to sensitize both regular education students and their
parents to the individual needs of their disabled
classmates while not sacrificing the pedagogy of regular
education students. Balancing rights for all students is an
issue that needs more in depth research by scholars in
future studies. Maintaining a quality learning environment
that protects equal protection and due process rights for
all students is a priority educators must fulfill. This
will require more scrutiny in the future.
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